The Containment of
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
UiirOSITUuV
INOV 02 19891
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENTS COLLECiiON
NOV 9 1989
University of Michigan • Fiiiu Licrury
Office of Technology Assessment
Congressional Board of the 101st Congress
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts. Chairman
CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio. Vice Chairman
Senate
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS
South Carolina
CLAIBORNE PELL
Rhode Island
TED STEVENS
Alaska
ORRIN G. HATCH
Utah
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY
Iowa
JOHN H. GIBBONS
(Nonvoting)
Advisory Council
MORRIS K. UDALL
Arizona
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.
California
JOHN D. DINGELL
Michigan
DON SUNDQUIST
Tennessee
AMO HOUGHTON
New York
DAVID S. POTTER, Chairman
General Motors Corp. (Ret.)
CHASE N. PETERSON, Vice Chairman
University of Utah
CHARLES A. BOWSHER
General Accounting Office
MICHEL T. HALBOUTY
Michel T. Halbouty Energy Co.
NEIL E. HARL
Iowa State University
JAMES C. HUNT
University of Tennessee
HENRY KOFFLER
University of Arizona
JOSHUA LEDERBERG
Rockefeller University
WILLIAM J. PERRY
H&Q Technology Partners
SALLY RIDE
California Space Institute
JOSEPH E. ROSS
Congressional Research Service
JOHN F.M. SIMS
Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc.
Director
JOHN H. GIBBONS
The Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report. The views expressed in this report are not necessarily
those of the Board, OTA Advisory Council, or individual members thereof
The Containment of
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
From the collection of the
o PreTinger
V iJibrary
San Francisco, California
2008
Recommended Citation:
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Containment of Underground Nuclear
Explosions, OTA-ISC-414 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October
1989).
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-600707
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325
(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword
Within weeks after the ending of World War II, plans for the first nuclear test series
"Operation Crossroads" were underway. The purpose then, as now, was to develop new
weapon systems and to study the effects of nuclear explosions on military equipment. The
development of the nuclear testing program has been paralled by public opposition from both
an arms control and an environmental perspective. Much of the criticism is due to the symbolic
nature of testing nuclear weapons and from the radiation hazards associated with the early
practice of testing in the aunosphere. Recently, however, specific concerns have also been
raised about the current underground testing program; namely:
• Are testing practices safe?
• Could an accidental release of radioactive material escape undetected?
• Is the public being fully informed of all the dangers emanating from the nuclear testing
program?
These concerns are fueled in part by the secrecy that surrounds the testing program and by
publicized problems at nuclear weapons production facilities.
At the request of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and Senator Orrin
G. Hatch, OTA undertook an assessment of the containment and monitoring practices of the
nuclear testing program. This special report reviews the safety of the nuclear testing program
and assesses the technical procedures used to test nuclear weapons and ensure that radioactive
material produced by test explosions remains contained underground. An overall evaluation
considers the acceptability of the remaining risk and discusses reasons for the lack of public
confidence.
In the course of this assessment, OTA drew on the experience of many organizations and
individuals. We appreciate the assistance of the U.S. Government agencies and private
companies who contributed valuable information, the workshop participants who provided
guidance and review, and the many additional reviewers who helped ensure the accuracy and
objectivity of this report.
JOHN H. GIBBONS
Director
Workshop 1: Containment
Monday, Sept. 26, 1988
Environmental Research Center
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Neville G. Cook, Chair
Department of Material Science and Mineral Engineering
University of California
Frederick N. App
Section Leader
Containment Geophysics
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Norman R. Burkhard
Containment Program Leader
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Jim Carothers
Chairman
Containment Evaluation Panel
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Jack Evemden
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
U.S. Geological Survey
Robert A. Fulkerson
Executive Director
Citizen Alert
Jack W. House
Containment FYogram Manager
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Billy C. Hudson
Deputy Containment Program Leader
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Evan Jenkins
U.S. Geological Survey
Joseph LaComb
Chief
Nevada Operations Office
Defense Nuclear Agency
James K. Magruder
Assistant Manager for Operations and Engineering
Nevada Operations Office
U.S. Department of Energy
Paul Orkild
U.S. Geological Survey
Edward W. Peterson
Containment Project Director
S-CUBED
John Stewart
Director
Test Operations Division
Nevada Operations Office
U.S. Department of Energy
Workshop 2: Monitoring
l\iesday, Sept. 27, 1988
Environmental Research Center
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Melvin W. Carter, Chair
Neely Professor Emeritus
Georgia Institute of Technology
, D A u Bemd Franke
Lynn R. Anspaugh ^.^^
Division Leader
Environmental Sciences Division Robert A. Fulkerson
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Executive Director
„ r^u u Citizen Alert
Bruce Church
Assistant Manager for Environmental Safety and Michael A. Marelli
Health Chief, Health Protection Branch
Nevada Operations Office Health Physics and Environmental Division
U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office
Charles P. Costa U-^- Department of Energy
Director Darryl Randerson
Nuclear Radiation Assessment Division Weather Service
United States Environmental Protection Agency Nuclear Office
Donald R. EUe
Chief, Technical Projects Branch
Health Physics and Environmental Division
Nevada Operations Office
U.S. Department of Energy
OTA Project Staff — The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA
Energy, Materials, and International Security Division
Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager*
Alan Shaw, International Security and Commerce Program Manager**
Gregory E. van der Vink, Project Director
Administrative Staff
Jannie Home (through November 1988)
Marie C. Parker (through April 1989)
Jackie Robinson
Louise Staley
1
"Through February 1989.
"From March 1989.
Acknowledgments
OTA gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions made by the following:
Lynn R. Anspaugh
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Frederick N. App
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Nick Aquilina
U.S. Department of Energy
Charles Archambeau
CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder
Stuart C. Black
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Carter Broyles
Sandia National Laboratory
Norman R. Burkhard
Lawrence Livermore Nationjil Laboratory
John H. Campbell
U.S. Department of Energy
Jim Carothers
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Melvin W. Carter
International Radiation Protection Consultant
Bruce Church
U.S. Department of Energy
Neville G. Cook
University of California, Berkeley
Charles P. Costa
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Jeff Duncan
Office of Congressman Edward J. Markey
Donald R. EUe
U.S. Department of Energy
Gerald L. Epstein
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Jack Evemden
U.S. Geological Survey
Anthony Fainberg
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
Pete Fitzsimmons
U.S. Department of Energy
Janet Fogg
U.S. Department of Energy
Bemd Franke
IFEU
Robert A. Fulkerson
Citizen Alert
Larry Gabriel
Defense Nuclear Agency
David Graham
Moore College of Art
Jack W. House
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Billy C. Hudson
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Evan Jenkins
U.S. Geological Survey
Gerald W. Johnson
University of California
Joseph W. LaComb
Defense Nuclear Agency
James K. Magruder
U.S. Department of Energy
Michael A. Marelli
U.S. Department of Energy
LTC Samuel D. McKinney
Defense Nuclear Agency
David N. McNelis
University of Las Vegas, Nevada
Paul Orkild
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Edward W. Peterson
S-CUBED
Dorothy F. Pope
Defense Nuclear Agency
Darryl Randerson
Weather Service, Nuclear Office
Karen Randolph
U.S. Department of Energy
R.L. Rhodes
Diebold, Inc.
Patrick Rowe
REECo
Robert Shirkey
Defense Nuclear Agency
John O. Stewart
U.S. Department of Energy
Robert Titus
Weather Service, Nuclear Office
Dean R. Townsend
Fenix & Scission, Inc.
Chris L. West
U.S. Department of Energy
Barbara Yoers
U.S. Department of Energy
NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the contributors. The
contributors do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full respwnsibility for the
ref)on and the accuracy of its contents.
Contents
Page
Chapter 1 . Executive Summary 3
Chapter 2. The Nuclear Testing Program 11
Chapter 3. Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions 31
Chapter 4. Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases 59
Chapter 1
Executive Summary
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 3
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 3
HOW SAFE HAS IT BEEN? 3
SPECinC CONCERNS 5
OVERALL EVALUATION 6
Table
Table Page
1-1. Releases From Underground Tests 4
Chapter 1
Executive Summary
The chances of an accidental release of radioactive material have been made as remote as possible.
Public concerns about safety are fueled by concerns about the testing program in general and
exacerbated by the government' s policy of not announcing all tests.
INTRODUCTION
During a nuclear explosion, billions of atoms
release their energy within a millionth of a
second, pressures reach several million pounds
per square inch, and temperatures are as high as
one-million degrees centigrade. A variety of
radioactive elements are produced depending on
the design of the explosive device and the
contribution of fission and fusion to the explo-
sion. The half-lives of the elements produced
range from less than a second to more than a
million years.
Each year over a dozen nuclear weapons are
detonated underground at the Nevada Test Site.^
The tests are used to develop new nuclear
weapons and to assess the effects of nuclear
explosions on military systems and other hard-
ware. Each test is designed to prevent the release
of radioactive material. The objective of each
test is to obtain the desired experimental infor-
mation and yet successfully contain the explo-
sion underground (i.e., prevent radioactive ma-
terial from reaching the atmosphere).
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH?
Deciding whether the testing program is safe
requires a judgment of how safe is safe enough.
The subjective nature of this judgment is
illustrated through the decision-making process
of the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP)
which reviews and assesses the containment of
each test.2 The panel evaluates the probability of
containment using the terms ' ' high confidence,"
"adequate degree of confidence," and "some
doubt." But the Containment Evaluation Panel
has no guidelines that attempt to quantify or
describe in probabilistic terms what constitutes
for example, an "adequate degree of confi-
dence." Obviously, there can never be 100
percent confidence that a test will not release
radioactive material. Whether "adequate confi-
dence" translates into a chance of 1 in 100, 1 in
1,000, or 1 in 1,000,000, requires a decision
about what is an acceptable level of risk. In turn,
decisions of acceptable level of risk can only be
made by weighing the costs of an unintentional
release against the benefits of testing. Conse-
quently, those who feel that testing is important
for our national security will accept greater risk,
and those who oppose nuclear testing will find
even small risks unacceptable.
Establishing an acceptable level of risk is
difficult, not only because of the value judg-
ments associated with nuclear testing, but also
because the risk is not seen as voluntary by those
outside the testing program. A public that
readily accepts the risks associated with volun-
tary activities — such as sky diving or smoking —
may still consider the much lower risks associ-
ated with nuclear testing unacceptable.
HOW SAFE HAS IT BEEN?
Some insight into the safety of the nuclear
testing program can be obtained by reviewing
the containment record. Releases of radioactive
material are categorized with terms that describe
both the volume of material released and the
conditions of the release:
'Currenlly, all U.S. nuclear test explosions are conducted at the Nevada Tfesl Site.
2The Containment Evaluation Panel is a group of representatives from various laboratories and technical consulting organizations who evaluate the
proposed containment plan for each test without regard to cost or other outside considerations (see ch. 2 for a complete discussion).
-3-
4 • Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Containment Failures: Containment fail-
ures are unintentional releases of radioactive
material to the atmosphere due to a failure of the
containment system. They are termed "vent-
ings," if they are prompt, massive releases; or
"seeps," if they are slow, small releases that
occur soon after the test.
Late-Time Seeps: Late-time seeps are small
releases that occur days or weeks after a test
when gases diffuse through pore spaces of the
overlying rock and are drawn to the surface by
decreases in atmospheric pressure.
Controlled Tunnel Purging: A controlled
tunnel purging is an intentional release to allow
either recovery of experimental data and equip-
ment or reuse of part of the tunnel system.
Operational Release: Operational releases
are small, consequential releases that occur
when core or gas samples are collected, or when
the drill-back hole is sealed.
The containment record can be presented in
different ways depending on which categories of
releases are included. Reports of total num-
bers of releases are often incomplete because
they include only announced tests or releases
due to containment failure. The upper portion
of table 1-1 includes every instance (for both
announced and unannounced tests) where radio-
active material has reached the atmosphere
under any circumstances whatsoever since
the 1970 Baneberry test.
Since 1970, 126 tests have resulted in radio-
active material reaching the atmosphere with a
total release of about 54,000 Curies (Ci). Of this
amount, 1 1 ,500 Ci were due to containment
failure and late-time seeps. The remaining
42,500 Ci were operational releases and con-
trolled tunnel purgings^ — with Mighty Oak (36,000
Ci) as the main source. The lower portion of the
table shows that the release of radioactive
material from underground nuclear testing since
Baneberry (54,000 Ci) is extremely small in
comparison to the amount of material released
Table 1-1 — Releases From Underground Tests
(normalized to 12 hours after event*)
All releases 1971-1988:
Containment Failures:
Camphor, 1971" 360 Ci
Diagonal Line, 1971 6,800
Riola, 1980 3,100
Agrini, 1 984 690
Late-time Seeps:
Kappeli, 1984 12
Tierra, 1 984 600
Latx^uark, 1 986 20
Bodie. 1986^ 52
Controlled Tunnel Purgings:
Hybia Fair, 1974 500
Hybia Gold, 1977 0.005
Miners Iron, 1980 0.3
Huron Landing, 1 982 280
Mini Jade, 1983 1
Mill Yard, 1985 5.9
Diamond Beech, 1985 1.1
Misty Rain, 1985 63
Mighty Oak, 1986 36,000
Mission Ghost, 1 987<= 3
Operational Releases:
108 tests from 1970-1988'* 5,500
Total since Baneberry: 54,000 CI
Major pre-1 971 releases:
Platte, 1962 1,900,000 Ci
Eel, 1962 1 ,900,000
Des Moines, 1 962 11 ,000,000
Baneberry, 1970 6,700,000
26 others from 1958-1970 3,800.000
Total: 25,300,000 Ci
Other Releases for Reference
NTS Atmospheric Testing 1951-1963: . . 12,000.000,000 Ci
1 Kiloton Aboveground Explosion: 10.000,000
Chernobyl (estimate): 81 ,000,000
3R+12 values apply only to containment failures, others are at time of
release.
''The Camphor failure includes 140 Ci from tunnel purging,
^Bodie and Mission Ghost also had drill-back releases.
''Many of these operational releases are associated with tests that were not
announced.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.
by pre-Baneberry underground tests (25,300,000
Ci), the early atmospheric tests at the Nevada
Test Site (12,000,000,000 Ci), or even the
amount that would be released by a single
1 -kiloton explosion conducted aboveground
(10,000,000 Ci).
From the perspective of human health risk:
If the same person had been standing at the
boundary of the Nevada Test Site in the area
of maximum concentration of radioactivity
for every test since Baneberry (1970), that
Chapter I — Executive Summary • 5
person's total exposure would be equivalent
to 32 extra minutes of normal background
exposure (or the equivalent of 1/1000 of a
single chest x-ray).
A worst-case scenario for a catastrophic
accident at the test site would be the prompt,
massive venting of a 150-kiloton test (the largest
allowed under the 1974 Threshold Test Ban
Treaty). The release would be in the range of 1
to 10 percent of the total radiation generated by
the explosion (compared to 6 percent released
by the Baneberry test or an estimated 10 percent
that would be released by a test conducted in a
hole open to the surface). Such an accident
would be comparable to a 15-kiloton above-
ground test, and would release approximately
150,000,000 Ci. Although such an accident
would be considered a major catastrophe today,
during the early years at the Nevada Test Site 25
aboveground tests had individual yields equal
to or greater than 15 kilotons.
SPECIFIC CONCERNS
Recently, several specific concerns about the
safety of the nuclear testing program have
arisen, namely:^
1 . Does the fracturing of rock at Rainier Mesa
pose a danger?
The unexpected formation of a surface col-
lapse crater during the 1984 Midas Myth test
focused concern about the safety of testing in
Rainier Mesa. The concern was heightened by
the observation of ground cracks at the top of the
Mesa and by seismic measurements indicating
a loss of rock strength out to distances greater
than the depth of burial of the nuclear device.
The specific issue is whether the repeated testing
in Rainier Mesa had fractured large volumes of
rock creating a "tired mountain" that no longer
had the strength to successfully contain future
underground tests. The inference that testing in
Rainier Mesa poses a high level of risk implies
that conditions for conducting a test on Rainier
are more dangerous than conditions for conduct-
ing a test on Yucca Flat.'* But, in fact, tests in
Rainier Mesa are buried deeper and spaced
further apart than comparable tests on Yucca
Flat.^ Furthermore, drill samples show no evi-
dence of any permanent decrease in rock
strength at distances greater than two cavity
radii from the perimeter of the cavity formed by
the explosion. The large distance of decreased
rock strength seen in the seismic measurements
is almost certainly due to the momentary
opening of pre-existing cracks during passage of
the shock wave. Most fractures on the top of the
mesa are due to surface spall and do not extend
down to the region of the test. Furthermore, only
minimal rock strength is required for contain-
ment. Therefore, none of the conditions of
testing in Rainier Mesa — burial depth, sepa-
ration distance, or material strength — imply
that leakage to the surface is more likely for
a tunnel test on Rainier Mesa than for a
vertical drill hole test on Yucca Flat.
2. Could an accidental release of radioactive
material go undetected?
A comprehensive system for detecting radio-
active material is formed by the combination of:
• the monitoring system deployed for each
test;
• the onsite monitoring system run by the
Department of Energy (DOE) and;
• the offsite monitoring system, run by
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
including the community monitoring sta-
tions.
There is essentially no possibility that a
significant release of radioactive material
'Detailed analysis of these concerns is included in chs. 3 and 4.
'' Approximately 90 percent of all nuclear test explosions are vertical drill hole tests conducted on Yucca Flat. See ch. 2 for an explanation of the
various types of tests.
'The greater depth of burial is due to convenience. It is easier to mine tunnels lower in the Mesa.
6 • Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
from an underground test could go unde-
tected.
3. Are we running out of room to test at the
Test Site?
Efforts to conserve space for testing in
Rainier Mesa have created the impression that
there is a "real estate problem" at the test site.^
The concern is that a shortage of space would
result in unsafe testing practices. Although it is
true that space is now used economically to
preserve the most convenient locations, other
less convenient locations are available within
the test site. Suitable areas within the test site
offer enough space to continue testing at
present rates for several more decades.
4. Do any unannounced tests release radioac-
tive material?
A test will be preannounced in the afternoon
2 days before the test if it is determined that the
maximum possible yield of the explosion is such
that it could result in perceptible ground motion
in Las Vegas. An announcement will be made
after a test if there is a prompt release of
radioactive material, or if any late-time release
results in radioactivity being detected off the test
site. The Environmental Protection Agency is
dependent on the Department of Energy for
notification of any late-time releases within the
boundaries of the test site. However, if EPA is
not notified, the release will still be detected by
EPA's monitoring system once radioactive ma-
terial reaches outside the test site. If it is judged
that a late-time release of radioactive mate-
rial will not be detected outside the bounda-
ries of the test site, the test may (and often
does) remain unannounced.
OVERALL EVALUATION
Every nuclear test is designed to be contained
and is reviewed for containment.' In each step of
the test procedure there is built-in redundancy
and conservatism. Every attempt is made to
keep the chance of containment failure as
remote as possible. This conservatism and
redundancy is essential, however; because no
matter how perfect the process may be, it
operates in an imperfect setting. For each test,
the containment analysis is based on samples,
estimates, and models that can only simplify and
(at best) approximate the real complexities of
the Earth. As a result, predictions about contain-
ment depend largely on judgments developed
from past experience. Most of what is known to
cause problems — carbonate material, water,
faults, scarps, clays, etc. — was learned through
experience. To withstand the consequences of a
possible surprise, redundancy and conservatism
is a requirement not an extravagance. Conse-
quently, all efforts undertaken to ensure a safe
testing program are necessary, and must con-
tinue to be vigorously pursued.
The question of whether the testing program
is "safe enough" will ultimately remain a value
judgment that weighs the importance of testing
against the risk to health and environment, hi
this sense, concern about safety will continue,
largely fueled by concern about the nuclear
testing program itself. However, given the
continuance of testing and the acceptance of the
associated environmental damage, the question
of "adequate safety" becomes replaced with the
less subjective question of whether any im-
provements can be made to reduce the chances
of an accidental release. In this regard, no areas
for improvement have been identified. This is
not to say that future improvements will not be
made as experience increases, but only that
essentially all suggestions that increase the
safety margin have been implemented. The
safeguards built into each test make the
chances of an accidental release of radioac-
tive material as remote as possible.
*See for example: William J. Broad, "Bomb Tests: Tfechnology Advances Against Backdrop of Wide Debate," New York Times. Apr. 15, 1986.
pp. C1-C3.
^See ch. 3 for a detailed accounting of the review process.
Chapter 1 — Executive Summary • 7
The acceptability of the remaining risk will
depend on public confidence in the nuclear
testing program. This confidence currently suf-
fers from a lack of confidence in the Department
of Energy emanating from problems at nuclear
weapons production facilities and from radia-
tion hazards associated with the past atmos-
pheric testing program. In the case of the present
underground nuclear testing program, this mis-
trust is exacerbated by DOE's reluctance to
disclose information concerning the testing
program, and by the knowledge that not all tests
releasing radioactive material to the atmosphere
(whatever the amount or circumstances) are
announced. As the secrecy associated with the
testing program is largely ineffective in prevent-
ing the dissemination of information concerning
the occurrence of tests, the justification for such
secrecy is questionable.^
The benefits of public dissemination of informa-
tion have been successfully demonstrated by the
EPA in the area of radiation monitoring. Openly
available community monitoring stations allow
residents near the test site to independently
verify information released by the government,
thereby providing reassurance to the community
at large. In a similar manner, public concern
over the testing program could be greatly
mitigated if a policy were adopted whereby
all tests are announced, or at least all tests
that release radioactive material to the atmos-
phere (whatever the conditions) are an-
nounced.
*See for example; Riley R. Geary, "Nevada Tfcsl Site's dirty little secrets," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 1989, pp. 35-38.
Chapter 2
The Nuclear Testing Program
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 11
THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR TESTING 11
LIMITS ON NUCLEAR TESTING 14
OTHER LOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR TESTS 15
THE NEVADA TEST SITE 15
TYPES OF NUCLEAR TESTS 18
ANNOUNCEMENT OF NUCLEAR TESTS 20
DETONATION AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE 22
Figures
Figure Page
2-1. U.S Nuclear Testing 13
2-2. Nevada Test Site 16
2-3. Drill-Back Operation 19
2-4. Locations of Tbnnel Tests in Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas 21
Chapter 2
The Nuclear Testing Program
The nuclear testing program has played a major role in developing new weapon systems and
determining the effects of nuclear explosions.
INTRODUCTION
In the past four decades, nuclear weapons have
evolved into highly sophisticated and specialized
devices. Throughout this evolution, the nuclear
testing program has played a major role in develop-
ing new weapon systems and determining the effects
of nuclear explosions.
THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR
TESTING
On July 16, 1945 the world's first nuclear bomb
(code named "Trinity") was detonated atop a
100- foot steel tower at the Alamogordo Bombing
Range. 55 miles northwest of Alamogordo, New
Mexico.' The explosion had a yield of 21 kilotons
(kts), the explosive energy equal to approximately
21,000 tons of TNT.2 The following month, Ameri-
can planes dropped two atomic bombs ("Litde
Boy," 13 kilotons; "Fat Man," 23 kilotons) on the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending
World War II and beginning the age of nuclear
weapons.^
Within weeks after the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, plans were underway to study the effects
of nuclear weapons and explore further design
possibilities. A subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was created, on November 10, 1945, to arrange
the first series of nuclear test explosions. President
Truman approved the plan on January 10, 1946. The
Bikini Atoll was selected as the test site and the
Bikinians were relocated to the nearby uninhabited
Rongerik Atoll. Two tests ("Able" and "Baker")
were detonated on Bikini in June and July of 1946 as
part of ' ' Operation Crossroads, ' ' a series designed to
study the effects of nuclear weapons on ships,
equipment, and material.'* The Bikini Atoll, how-
ever, was found to be loo small to accommodate
support facilities for the next test series and so
"Operation Sandstone" was conducted on the
nearby Enewetak Atoll. The tests of Operation
Sandstone ("X-ray," "Yoke," and "Zebra") were
proof tests for new bomb designs.
As plans developed to expand the nuclear arsenal,
the expense, security, and logistical problems of
tesdng in the Pacific became burdensome. Attention
turned toward establishing a test site within the
condnental United States. The Nevada Test Site was
chosen in December 1950 by President Truman as a
continental proving ground for testing nuclear weap-
ons. A month later, the first test — code named
"Able" — was conducted using a device dropped
from a B-50 bomber over Frenchman Flat as part of
a five-test series called "Operation Ranger." The
five tests were completed within 1 1 days at what was
then called the "Nevada Proving Ground."
Although the Nevada Test Site was fully opera-
tional by 1951, the Pacific continued to be used as a
test site for developing thermonuclear weapons (also
called hydrogen or fusion bombs). On October 31,
1952, the United States exploded the first hydrogen
(fusion) device on Enewetak Atoll.'' The test, code
named "Mike," had an explosive yield of 10,4(X)
kilotons — over 200 times the largest previous test.
'The Alamogordo Bombing Range is now the White Sands Missile Range.
2a kilolon (l<t) was originally defined as the explosive equivalent of 1 ,000 tons of TNT. This definition, however, was found to be imprecise for two
reasons. First, there is some variation in the experimental and theoretical values of the explosive energy released by TNT (although the majority of values
lie in the range from 900 to 1.100 calories per gram). Second, the term kiloton could refer to a short kiloton (2x10* pounds), a metric kiloton (2.205x10''
pounds), or a long kiloton (2.24x 10'' pounds). It was agreed, therefore, during the Manhattan Project that the term "kiloton" would refer to the release
of 10'^ (1,000,000.000.000) calones of explosive energy.
3John Malik, "The Yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Explosions," l^s Alamos National Laboratory report LA-8819, 1985.
"The target consisted of a Hect of over 90 vessels assembled in the Bikini Lagoon including three captured German and Japanese ships; surplus U.S.
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; and amphibious crafi.
'The first test of an actual hydrogen bomb (rather than a device located on the surface) was "Cherokee" which was dropped from a plane over Bikini
Atoll on May 20, 1956. Extensive preparations were made for the test that included the construction of artificial islands to house measuring equipment.
The elaborate experiments required that the bomb be dropped in a precise location in space. To accomplish this, the Stfalegic Air Command held a
competition for bombing accuracy. Although the winner hit the correct point in every practice run, during the test the bomb was dropped 4 miles off-largel.
-11-
12 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
The test was followed 2 weeks later by the 500
kiloton explosion "King," the largest fission weapon
ever tested.
At the Nevada Test Site, low-yield fission devices
continued to be tested. Tests were conducted with
nuclear bombs dropped from planes, shot from
cannons, placed on top of towers, and suspended
from balloons. The tests were designed both to
develop new weapons and to learn the effects of
nuclear explosions on civilian and military struc-
tures. Some tests were conducted in conjunction
with military exercises to prepare soldiers for what
was then termed "the atomic batdefield."
In the Pacific, the next tests of thermonuclear
(hydrogen) bombs were conducted under "Opera-
tion Castle," a series of six tests detonated on the
Bikini Atoll in 1954. The first test, "Bravo," was
expected to have a yield of about 6,000 kilotons. The
actual yield, however, was 15,000 kilotons — over
twice what was expected.^ The radioactive fallout
covered an area larger than anticipated and because
of a faulty weather prediction, the fallout pattern was
more easterly than expected. A Japanese fishing
boat, which had accidentally wandered into the
restricted zone without being detected by the Task
Force, was showered with fallout. When the fishing
boat docked in Japan, 23 crew members had
radiation sickness. The radio operator died of
infectious hepatitis, probably because of the large
number of required blood transfusions.^ The faulty
fallout prediction also led to the overexposure of the
inhabitants of two of the Marshall Islands 100 miles
to the East. In a similar though less severe accident,
radioactive rain from a Soviet thermonuclear test fell
on Japan.* These accidents began to focus world-
wide attention on the increased level of nuclear
testing and the dangers of radioactive fallout. Public
opposition to atmospheric testing would continue to
mount as knowledge of the effects of radiation
increased and it became apparent that no region of
the world was untouched.^
Attempts to negotiate a ban on nuclear testing
began at the United Nations Disarmament Confer-
ence in May 1955. For the next several years efforts
to obtain a test ban were blocked as agreements in
nuclear testing were linked to progress in other arms
control agreements and as differences over verifica-
tion requirements remained unresolved. In 1958,
President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Khrushchev
declared, through unilateral public statements, a
moratorium on nuclear testing and began negotia-
tions on a comprehensive test ban. The United States
adopted the moratorium after conducting 1 3 tests in
seven days at the end of October 1958. Negotiations
broke down first over the right to perform onsite
inspections, and then over the number of such
inspections. In December 1959, President Eisen-
hower announced that the United States would no
longer consider itself bound by the "voluntary
moratorium" but would give advance notice if it
decided to resume testing. Meanwhile (during the
moratorium), the French began testing their newly
acquired nuclear capability. The Soviet Union,
which had announced that it would observe the
moratorium as long as the western powers would not
test, resumed testing in September 1 961 with a series
of the largest tests ever conducted. The United States
resumed testing two weeks later (figure 2-1)."'
Public opposition to nuclear testing continued to
mount. Recognizing that the U.S. could continue its
development program solely through underground
testing and that the ratification of a comprehensive
test ban could not be achieved. President Kennedy
proposed a limited ban on tests in the atmosphere,
the oceans, and space. The Soviets, who through
their own experience were convinced that their test
program could continue underground, accepted the
proposal. With both sides agreeing that such a treaty
could be readily verified, the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT) was signed in 1963, banning all
aboveground or underwater testing.
In addition to military applications, the engineer-
ing potential of nuclear weapons was recognized by
the inid-1950's. The Plowshare Program was formed
in 1957 to explore the possibility of using nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes." Among the
*Bravo was Ihe largest test ever detonated by the United States.
^See "The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon," Ralph E. Lapp, 1957, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York.
'"Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements," United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC, 1982 Edition, p. 34.
'Since the large thermonuclear tests, all people have slrontium-90 (a sister element of calcium) in their bones, and cesiuni-137 (a sister element of
potassium) in their muscle. Also, the amount ofiodine-131 in milk in the United States correlates with the frequency of atmospheric testing.
'"See "Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements," United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1982 edition.
"The name is from ". . . . they shall beat their swords into plowshares," Isaiah 2:4.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 75
Figure 2-1— U.S. Nuclear Testing
LTBT TTBT
Key: LTBT = 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
TTBT = 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
1945 1950
I I Above-ground tests
I Underground tests
SOURCE: Data from tho Swedish Defense Research Institute.
applications considered were the excavation of
canals and harbors, the creation of underground
storage cavities for fuel and waste, the fracturing of
rock to promote oil and gas flow, and the use of
nuclear explosions to cap oil gushers and extinguish
fires. It was reported that even more exotic applica-
tions, such as melting glaciers for irrigation, were
being considered by the Soviet Union.
The first test under the Plowshare Program,
"Gnome," was conducted 4 years later to create an
underground cavity in a large salt deposit. The next
Plowshare experiment, Sedan in 1962, used a 104
kiloton explosion to excavate 12 million tons of
earth. In 1965, the concept of "nuclear excavation"
was refined and proposed as a means of building a
second canal through Panama. '^ Three nuclear
excavations were tested under the Plowshare pro-
gram ("Cabriolet," Jan. 26, 1968; "Buggy," Mar.
12, 1968; and "Schooner," Dec. 12, 1968). Schoo-
ner, however, released radioactivity off site and, as
a consequence, no future crater test was approved.
Consideration of the radiological and logistical
aspects of the project also contributed to its demise.
Estimates of the engineering requirements indicated
that approximately 250 separate nuclear explosions
with a total yield of 1 20 megatons would be required
to excavate the canal through Panama. Furthermore,
fallout predictions indicated that 16,000 square
kilometers of territory would need to be evacuated
for the duration of the operation and several months
thereafter. '3 Because it was also clear that no level
of radioactivity would be publicly acceptable, the
program was terminated in the early 1970s.
In 1974, President Richard Nixon signed the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) restricting all
nuclear test explosions to a defined test site and to
yields no greater than 150 kilotons. As a result, all
U.S. underground nuclear tests since 1974 have been
conducted at the Nevada Test Site. As part of the
earlier 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United
States established a series of safeguards. One of
them, "Safeguard C," requires the United States to
maintain the capability to resume atmospheric
testing in case the treaty is abrogated. The Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) and the Defense Nuclear
Agency continue today to maintain a facility for the
'^Thc 1956 war over the Suez Canal created the first specific proposals for using nuclear explosions to create an alternative canal.
"Bruce A. Bolt, "Nuclear Explosions and Earthquakes, The Parted Veil" San Francisco. CA: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1976. pp. 192-196.
14 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit: David Graham. 19
Sedan Crater
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons at the
Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
LIMITS ON NUCLEAR TESTING
The testing of nuclear weapons by the United
States is currently restricted by three major treaties
that were developed for both environmental and
arms control reasons. The three treaties are:
1. the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
which bans nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,
outer space, and underwater, and restricts the release
of radiation into the atmosphere,
2. the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which
restricts the testing of underground nuclear weapons
by the United States and the Soviet Union to yields
no greater than 150 kilotons, and
3. the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET), which is a complement to the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (riBT). It restricts individual
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) by the United
States and the Soviet Union to yields no greater than
150 kilotons, and group explosions (consisting of a
number of individual explosions detonated simulat-
enously) to aggregate yields no greater than 1 ,500
kilotons.
Although both the 1974 TTBT and the 1976
PNET remain unratified, both the United States and
the Soviet Union have expressed their intent to abide
by the yield limit. Because neither country has
indicated an intention not to ratify the treaties, both
parties are obligated to refrain from any acts that
would defeat their objective and purpose.'"* Conse-
quently, all nuclear test explosions compliant with
treaty obligations must be conducted underground,
at specific test sites (unless a PNE), and with yields
no greater than 150 kilotons. The test must also be
contained to the extent that no radioactive debris is
detected outside the territorial limits of the country
that conducted the test.'^ Provisions do exist,
however, for one or two slight, unintentional breaches
per year of the 150 kiloton limit due to the technical
uncertainties associated with predicting the exact
yields of nuclear weapons tests. '^
'''Art. 18, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
''An. I, Kb), 1963 Limited Tfest Ban Treaty.
'^Statement of understanding included with the transmittal documents accompanying the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty when submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on July 29, 1979.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 15
OTHER LOCATIONS OF
NUCLEAR TESTS
U.S. nuclear test explosions were also conducted
in areas other than the Pacific and the Nevada Test
Site.
Three tests with yields of 1 to 2 kilotons were
conducted over the South Atlantic as "Operation
Argus." The tests ("Argus I," Aug. 27, 1958;
"Argus II," Aug. 30, 1958; and "Argus III," Sept.
6, 1958) were detonated at an altitude of 300 miles
to assess the effects of high-altitude nuclear detona-
tions on communications equipment and missile
performance.
Five tests, all involving chemical explosions but
with no nuclear yield, were conducted at the Nevada
Bombing Range to study plutonium dispersal. The
tests, "Project 57 NO 1," April 24, 1957; "Double
Tracks," May 15, 1963; "Clean Slate I," May 25,
1963; "Clean Slate II," May 31, 1963; and "Clean
Slate III," June 9, 1963; were safety tests to establish
storage and transportation requirements.
Two tests were conducted in the Tatum Salt Dome
near Hattiesburg, Mississippi, as part of the Vela
Uniform experiments to improve seismic methods of
detecting underground nuclear explosions. The first
test "Salmon," October 22, 1964, was a 5.3 kiloton
explosion that formed an underground cavity. The
subsequent test "Sterling," December 3, 1966, was
0.38 kt explosion detonated in the cavity formed by
Salmon. The purpose of the Salmon/Sterling experi-
ment was to assess the use of a cavity in reducing the
size of seismic signals produced by an underground
nuclear test.' ^
Three joint government-industry tests were con-
ducted as part of the Plowshare Program to develop
peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. The experi-
ments were designed to improve natural gas extrac-
tion by fracturing rock formations. The first test,
"Gasbuggy," was a 29 kiloton explosion detonated
on December 10, 1967, near Bloomfield, New
Mexico. The next two were in Colorado: "Rulison"
was a 40 kiloton explosion, detonated near Grand
Valley on September 10, 1969; and "Rio Blanco"
was a salvo shot of three explosions, each with a
y ield of 3 3 kt, detonated near Rifle on May 17, 1973.
Three tests were conducted on Amchitka Island,
Alaska. The first (October 29, 1965), "Long Shot"
was an 80 kiloton explosion that was part of the Vela
Uniform project. The second test, "Milrow," Octo-
ber 2, 1969, was about a one megaton explosion to
"calibrate" the island and assure that it would
contain a subsequent test of the Spartan Anti-
Ballistic Missile warhead. The third test, "Canni-
kin," November 6, 1971, was the Spartan warhead
test with a reported yield of "less than five
megatons." This test, by far the highest-yield
underground test ever conducted by the United
States, was too large to be safely conducted in
Nevada.'*
Three individual tests were also conducted in
various parts of the western United States. "Gnome"
was a 3 kiloton test conducted on December 10,
1961 near Carlsbad, New Mexico, to create a large
underground cavity in salt as part of a multipurpose
experiment. One application was the possible use of
the cavity for the storage of oil and gas. "Shoal"
was a 1 2 kiloton test conducted on October 26, 1 963
near Fallon, Nevada as part of the Vela Uniform
project. "Faultless" was a test with a yield of
between 200 and 1 ,(X)0 kiloton that was exploded on
January 19, 1968, at a remote area near Hot Creek
Valley, Nevada. FauUless was a ground-motion
calibration test to evaluate a Central Nevada Supple-
mental Test Area. The area was proposed as a
alternative location for high-yield tests to decrease
the ground shaking in Las Vegas.
THE NEVADA TEST SITE
The Nevada Tfest Site is located 65 miles north-
west of Las Vegas. It covers 1,350 square miles, an
area slightiy larger than Rhode Island (figure 2-2).
The test site is surrounded on three sides by an
additional 4,(X)0 to 5,000 square miles belonging to
Nellis Air Force Base and the Tonopah Tfest Range.
The test site has an administrative center, a control
point, and areas where various testing activities are
conducted.
At the southern end of the test site is Mercury, the
administrative headquarters and supply base for
"For a complete discussion of the issues related to Seismic Verification see, U.S. Congress, Office of Tfechnology Assessment, Seismic Verification
of Nuclear Testing Treaties, OTA-ISC-361, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988.
"The predictions of ground motion suggested that an unacceptable amount (in terms of claims and dollars) of damage would occur to structures if
the test was conducted in Nevada.
76 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 2-2 — Nevada Test Site
SOURCE: Modified from Department of Energy.
DOE contractors and other agencies involved in
Nevada Operations. Mercury contains a limited
amount of housing for test site personnel and other
ground support facilities.
Near the center of the test site, overlooking
Frenchman Flat to the South and Yucca Flat to the
North, is the Control Point (CP). The CP is the
command headquarters for testing activities and is
the location from which all tests are detonated and
monitored.
Frenchman Flat is the location of the first nuclear
test at the test site. A total of 14 atmospheric tests
occurred on Frenchman Flat between 1951 and
1962. Most of these tests were designed to determine
the effects of nuclear explosions on structures and
military objects. The area was chosen for its flat
terrain which permitted good photography of deto-
nations and fireballs. Also, 10 tests were conducted
underground at Frenchman Flat between 1965 and
1 97 1 . Frenchman Flat is no longer used as a location
for testing. The presence of carbonate material
makes the area less suitable for underground testing
than other locations on the test site.'*^
Yucca Flat is where most underground tests occur
today. These tests are conducted in vertical drill
holes up to 10 feet in diameter and from 600 ft to
more than 1 mile deep. It is a valley 10 by 20 miles
extending north from the CP. Tests up to about 300
kilotons in yield have been detonated beneath Yucca
"Dtiring an explosion, carbonate material can form carbon dioxide which, under pressure, can cause venting.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 17
iiH^^-i >^
■smx9M ^it
Photo credit Da^d Grahan
Test Debris on Frenchman Flat
Flat, although Pahute Mesa is now generally re-
served for high-yield tests.
Tests up to 1 ,000 kilotons in yield have occurred
beneath Pahute Mesa, a 1 70 square mile area in the
extreme north-western part of the test site. The deep
water table of Pahute Mesa permits underground
testing in dry holes at depths as great as 2,100 feet.
The distant location is useful for high-yield tests
because it minimizes the chance that ground motion
will cause damage offsite.
Both Livermore National Laboratory and Los
Alamos National Laboratory have specific areas of
the test site reserved for their use. Los Alamos uses
areas 1, 3,4(east), 5, and 7 in Yucca Flat and area 19
on Pahute Mesa; Livermore uses areas 2, 4(west), 8,
9, and 10 in Yucca Rat, and area 20 on Pahute Mesa
(figure 2-2). While Los Alamos generally uses
Pahute Mesa only to relieve schedule conflicts on
Yucca Flat, Livermore normally uses it for large test
explosions where the depth of burial would require
the test to be below the water table on Yucca Rat.
The Nevada Tfest Site employs over 11,000
people, with about 5,000 of them working on the site
proper. The annual budget is approximately $1
billion divided among testing nuclear weapons
(81%) and the development of a storage facility for
radioactive waste (19%). The major contractors are
Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. (REECo),
18 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit Department of Energy
Aerial View of Yucxia Flat
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Greer (EG&G), Fenix &
Scisson, Inc., and Holmes & Narver, Inc. REECo has
5,000 employees at the test site for construction,
maintenance, and operational support, which in-
cludes large diameter drilling and tunneling, on-site
radiation monitoring, and operation of base camps.
EG&G has 2,200 employees, who design, fabricate,
and operate the diagnostic and scientific equipment.
Fenix & Scisson, Inc. handles the design, research,
inspection, and procurement for the drilling and
mining activities. Holmes & Narver, Inc. has respon-
sibility for architectural design, engineering design,
and inspection. In addition to contractors, several
government agencies provide support to the testing
program: the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has responsibility for radiation monitoring
outside the Nevada Test Site; the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides
weather analyses and predictions; and the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) provides geologi-
cal, geophysical, and hydrological assessments of
test locations.
TYPES OF NUCLEAR TESTS
Presently, an average of more than 12 tests per
year are conducted at the Nevada Test Site. Each test
is either at the bottom of a vertical drill hole or at the
end of a horizontal tunnel. The vertical drill hole
tests are the most common (representing over 90%
of all tests conducted) and occur either on Yucca Flat
or, if they are large-yield tests, on Pahute Mesa.
Most vertical drill hole tests are for the purpose of
developing new weapon systems. Horizontal tunnel
tests are more costly and time-consuming. They only
occur once or twice a year and are located in tunnels
mined in the Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. TUnnel
tests are generally for evaluating the effects (radia-
tion, ground shock, etc.) of various weapons on
military hardware and systems. In addition, the
United Kingdom also tests at a rate of about once a
year at the Nevada Test Site.
It takes 6 to 8 weeks to drill a hole depending on
depth and location. The holes used by Livermore and
Los Alamos differ slightly. Los Alamos typically
uses holes with diameters that range from about 4
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program •19
Figure 2-3— Drill-Back Operation
Drill rig
Photo credit Department of Energy
Emplacement Tower for Vertical Drill Hole Test
1/2 up to 7 ft; while Livermore typically uses 8-ft
diameter holes and an occasional 10-ft diameter
hole.^° Livermore usually places its experimental
devices above the water table to avoid the additional
time and expense required to case holes below the
water table.
When the device is detonated at the bottom of a
vertical drill hole, data from the test are transmitted
through electrical and fiber-optic cables to trailers
containing recording equipment. Performance infor-
mation is also determined from samples of radioac-
tive material that are recovered by drilling back into
the solidified melt created by the explosion (figure
2-3). On rare occasions, vertical drill holes have
been used for effects tests. One such test, "Huron
King," used an initially open, vertical "line-of-
sight" pipe that extended upwards to a large
SOURCE: Modified from Micfiael W Butler. Pastshot Drilling Handbook,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Jan. 19. 1984.
enclosed chamber located at the surface. The cham-
ber contained a satellite inside a vacuum to simulate
the conditions of space. The radiation from the
explosion was directed up the hole at the satellite.
The explosion was contained by a series of mechan-
ical pipe closures that blocked the pipe immediately
after the initial burst of radiation. The purpose of the
test was to determine how satellites might be
affected by the radiation produced by a nuclear
explosion.
TUnnel tests occur within horizontal tunnels that
are drilled into the volcanic rock of Rainier or
Aqueduct Mesa. From 1970 through 1988, there
^OLivermore has considered the use of 12 ft diameter holes, but has not yet used one.
20 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit David Graham. 1986
Huron King Test
have been 31 tunnel tests conducted in Rainier and
Aqueduct Mesas (figure 2-4). It may require 12
months of mining, using three shifts a day, to remove
the 1 million cubic feet of rock that may be needed
to prepare for a tunnel test.
Effects tests performed within mined tunnels are
designed to determine the effects of nuclear explosion-
produced radiation on missile nose cones, warheads,
satellites, communications equipment, and other
military hardware. The tunnels are large enough so
that satellites can be tested at full scale in vacuum
chambers that simulate outer space. The tests are
used to determine how weapons systems will
withstand radiation that might be produced by a
nearby explosion during a nuclear war. Nuclear
effects tests were the first type of experiments
performed during trials in the Pacific and were an
extensive part of the testing program in the 1950s. At
that time, many tests occurred above ground and
included the study of effects on structures and civil
defense systems.
Effects tests within cavities provide a means of
simulating surface explosions underground. A large
hemispherical cavity is excavated and an explosion
is detonated on or near the floor of the cavity. The
tests are designed to assess the capability of above-
ground explosions to transmit energy into the
ground. This information is used to evaluate the
capability of nuclear weapons to destroy such targets
as missile silos or underground command centers.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program •21
Figure 2-4 — Locations of Tunnel Tests in Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas
Aqueduct
Mesa
U12p
Topographic
of Mesa
Rainier
Mesa
U12e
• Test location
Tunnels
3,000 ft
U12g
SOURCE: Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency
ANNOUNCEMENT OF
NUCLEAR TESTS
The existence of each nuclear test conducted prior
to the signing of the LTBT on August 5, 1963, has
been declassified. Many tests conducted since the
signing of the LTBT, however, have not been
announced. Information concerning those tests is
classified. The yields of announced tests are pres-
ently reported only in the general categories of either
less than 20 kilotons, or 20 to 150 kilotons. The
DOE's announcement pohcy is that a test will be
pre-announced in the afternoon 2 days before the test
if it is determined that the maximum credible yield
is such that it could result in perceptible ground
motion in Las Vegas. The test will be post an-
nounced if there is a prompt release of radioactive
material or if any late-time release results in
22 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
■amm^m^tm-'iiiiu
■m
Phoio aedil: David Graham. 1988
Tunnel Entrance
radioactive material being detected off the test site.
In the case of late-time release, however, the test will
be announced only if radioactive material is de-
tected off -site.
Starting with Trinity, names have been assigned
to all nuclear tests. The actual nuclear weapon or
device and its description are classified. Conse-
quently, test planners assign innocuous code words
or nicknames so that they may refer to planned tests.
Early tests used the military phonetic alphabet
(Able, Baker, Charlie, etc.). As more tests took
place, other names were needed. They include
names of rivers, mountains, famous scientists, small
mammals, counties and towns, fish, birds, vehicles,
cocktails, automobiles, trees, cheeses, wines, fab-
rics, tools, nautical terms, colors, and so forth.
DETONATION AUTHORITY AND
PROCEDURE
The testing of nuclear weapons occurs under the
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (as
amended in 1954), which states:
"The development, use, and control of Atomic
Energy shall be directed so as to make the maximum
contribution to the general welfare, subject at all
times to the paramount objective of making the
maximum contribution to the common defense and
security."
The act authorizes the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (now Department of Energy), to "con-
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 23
Photo credit: Department of Energy
Interior Tunnel
duct experiments and do research and development
work in the military application of atomic energy."
The fiscal year testing program receives authori-
zation from the President. Each fiscal year, the
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of En-
ergy (DOE), and the weapons laboratories (Law-
rence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos
National Laboratory) develop a nuclear testing
program. The Secretary of Energy proposes the
upcoming year's program in a letter to the President
through the National Security Council. The National
Security Council solicits comments on the test
program from its members and incorporates those
24 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit: Defense Nuclear Agency
End of Tunnel
comments in its recommendation letter to the
President. The Nevada Operations Office plans the
individual tests with the responsible laboratory.
Both Livermore and Lx)s Alamos maintain stock-
piles of holes in various areas of the test site.^' When
a specific test is proposed, the lab will check its
inventory to see if a suitable hole is available or if a
new one must be drilled.
Once a hole is selected, the sponsoring laboratory
designs a plan to fiU-in (or "stem") the hole to
contain the radioactive material produced by the
explosion. The USGS and Earth scientists from
several organizations analyze the geology surround-
2'Each laboratory operates its own drilling crews continuously to maximize the economy of the drilling operation.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 25
Photo credit: Defense Nuclear Agency
Tunnel Cavity
ing the proposed hole and review it for containment.
The laboratory then presents the full containment
plan to the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP) 2
to 3 months in advance of the detonation. The CEP
is a panel of experts that review and evaluate the
containment plan for each test.^^ Each CEP panel
member goes on record with a statement concerning
his judgment of the containment. The CEP chairman
summarizes the likelihood of containment and gives
his recommendation to the manager of Nevada
Operations.
Following the CEP meeting, a Detonation Au-
thority Request (DAR) package is prepared. The
DAR package contains a description of the proposed
test, the containment plan, the recommendations of
the CEP, the chairman's statement, a review of the
environmental impact, a nuclear safety study,^^ a
review of compliance with the TTBT, the public
announcement plans, and any noteworthy aspects of
the test. The DAR package is sent to the DOE Office
of Mihtary Application for approval. Although test
preparations are underway throughout the approval
process, no irreversible action to conduct the test is
taken prior to final approval.
After the test has been approved, the Test Group
Director of the sponsoring Laboratory will then
request "authority to move, emplace, and stem" the
nuclear device from the Nevada test site "Test
Controller" for that specific test. The Test Control-
ler also has an advisory panel consisting of a
Chairman and three other members. The Chairman
(called the Scientific Advisor) is a senior scientist
^^See Ch. 3, "Containment Evaluation Panel."
23The nuclear safety study prepared by DOE Safely Division contains safety considerations not related to containment, such as the possibility of
premature or inadvertent detonation.
^''In the case of tests sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), the Scientific Advisor is from Sandia National Laboratory.
26 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
from the sponsoring laboratory. ^^ The three mem-
bers are all knowledgeable about the weapons-
testing program and consist of:
1. an EPA senior scientist with expertise in
radiation monitoring,
2. a weather service senior scientist knowledgea-
ble in meteorology, and
3. a medical doctor with expertise in radiation
medicine.
Once the test has been approved for execution by the
Test Controller's panel, the Test Controller has sole
responsibility to determine when or whether the test
will be conducted. The Test Controller and Advisory
Panel members conduct the following series of
technical meetings to review the test:^
D-7 Safety Planning Meeting: The "D-7 Safety
Planning Meeting" is held approximately 1 week
before the test. This meeting is an informal review
of the test procedure, the containment plan, the
expected yield, the maximum credible yield, the
potential for surface collapse, the potential ground
shock, the expected long-range weather conditions,
the location of radiation monitors, the location of all
personnel, the security concerns (including the
possibility of protesters intruding on the test site),
the countdown, the pre-announcement policy, and
any other operational or safety aspects related to the
test.
D-1 Safety Planning Meeting: The day before the
test, the D-1 Safety Planning Meeting is held. This
is an informal briefing that reviews and updates all
the information discussed at the D-7 meeting.
D-1 Containment Briefing: The D-1 Containment
Briefing is a formal meeting. The laboratory reviews
again the containment plan and discusses whether all
of the stemming and other containment require-
ments were met. The meeting determines the extent
to which the proposed containment plan was carried
out in the field.^^ The laboratory and contractors
provide written statements on their concurrence of
the stemming plan.
D-1 Readiness Briefing: The D-1 Readiness
Briefing is a formal meeting to review potential
weather conditions and the predicted radiation
fallout pattern for the case of an accidental venting.
The night before the test, the weather service
sends out observers to release weather balloons and
begin measuring wind direction and speed to a
height of 1 ,400 ft above the ground. The area around
the test (usually all areas north of the Control Point
complex) is closed to all nonessential personnel. The
Environmental Protection Agency deploys monitor-
ing personnel off-site to monitor fallout and coordi-
nate protective measures, should they be necessary.
D-Day Readiness Briefing: The morning of the
test, the Test Controller holds the "D-Day Readi-
ness Briefing." At this meeting, updates of weather
conditions and forecasts are presented. In additon,
the weather service reviews the wind and stability
measurements to make final revisions to the fallout
pattern in the event of an accidental venting. The
fallout pattern is used to project exposure rates
throughout the potential affected area. The exposure
rates are calculated using the standard radiological
models of whole-body exposure and infant thyroid
dose from a family using milk cows in the fallout
region. The status of on-site ground-based and
airborne radiation monitoring is reviewed. The
location of EPA monitoring personnel is adjusted to
the projected fallout pattern, and the location of all
personnel on the test site is confirmed. At the end of
the meeting, the Scientific Advisor who is chairman
of the Test Controller's Advisory Panel makes a
recommendation to the Test Controller to proceed or
delay.
If the decision is made to proceed, the Test
Controller gives permission for the nuclear device to
be armed. The operation of all radiation monitors,
readiness of aircraft, location of EPA personnel, etc.,
are confirmed. If the status remains favorable and the
weather conditions are acceptable, the Test Control-
ler gives permission to start the countdown and to
fire. If nothing abnormal occurs, the countdown
proceeds to detonation. If a delay occurs, the
appropriate preparatory meetings are repeated.
^^In the case of tests sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), the Scientific Advisor is from Sandia National Laboratory.
2' Although the test has been planned to be contained, test preparations include provisions for an accidental release of radioactive material. Sue!
provisions include the deployment of an emergency response team for each test.
2*For example, readings from temperature sensors placed in the stemming plugs are examined to determine whether the plugs have hardened.
Chapter 2 — The Nuclear Testing Program • 27
Photo credit: Departmant of Energy
Test Control Center
Chapter 3
Containing Underground
Nuclear Explosions
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 31
WHAT HAPPENS DURING AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION 32
Microseconds 32
Milliseconds 32
Tenths of a Second 32
A Few Seconds 32
Minutes to Days 32
WHY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS REMAIN CONTAINED 34
SELECTING LOCATION, DEPTH. AND SPACING: 35
REVIEWING A TEST SITE LOCATION 37
CONTAINMENT EVALUATION PANEL 38
CONTAINING VERTICAL SHAFT TESTS 40
CONTAINING HORIZONTAL TUNNEL TESTS 41
TYPES OF RADIATION RELEASES 46
Containment Failure: 46
Late-Time Seep 46
Controlled Tlinnel Purging 47
Operational Release 47
RECORD OF CONTAINMENT 47
Containment Evaluation Panel 47
Vertical Drill Hole Tests 48
Horizontal Tlinnel Tests 48
From the Perspective of Human Health Risk 49
A FEW EXAMPLES: 49
IS THERE A REAL ESTATE PROBLEM AT NTS? 51
TIRED MOUNTAIN SYNDROME? 51
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 54
Box
Box Page
3-A. Baneberry 33
Figures
Figure Page
3-1. Formation of Stress "Containment Cage" 35
3-2. Minimum Shot Separation for Drill Hole Tests 38
3-3. Minimum Shot Separation for TUnnel Tests 39
3-4. "Typical" Stemming Plan 41
3-5. Three Redundant Containment Vessels 42
3-6. Vessel I 43
3-7. Vessel I Closures 44
3-8. Tbnnel Closure Sequence 45
3-9. Typical Post-Shot Configuration 46
3-10. Radius of Decrease in Rock Strength 53
Table
Table Page
3-1 . Release From Underground Tests 48
Chapter 3
Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions
Underground nuclear tests are designed and reviewed for containment, with redundancy and
conservatism in each step.
INTRODUCTION
The United States' first underground nuclear test,
codenamed "Pascal- A," was detonated at the bot-
tom of a 499-foot open drill-hole on July 26, 1957.'
Although Pascal-A marked the beginning of under-
ground testing, above ground testing continued for
another 6 years. With testing simultaneously occur-
ring aboveground, the release of radioactive material
from underground explosions was at first not a major
concern. Consequently, Pascal-A, like many of the
early underground tests that were to follow, was
conducted "roman candle" style in an open shaft
that allowed venting. ^
As public sensitivity to fallout increased, guide-
lines for testing in Nevada became more stringent. In
1956, the weapons laboratories pursued efforts to
reduce fallout by using the lowest possible test
yields, by applying reduced fission yield or clean
technology, and by containing explosions under-
ground. Of these approaches, only underground
testing offered hope for eliminating fallout. The
objective was to contain the radioactive material, yet
still collect all required information. The first
experiment designed to contain an explosion com-
pletely underground was the "Rainier" test, which
was detonated on September 19, 1957. A nuclear
device with a known yield of 1.7 kilotons was
selected for the test. The test was designed with two
objectives: 1) to prevent the release of radioactivity
to the atmosphere, and 2) to determine whether
diagnostic information could be obtained from an
underground test. The test was successful in both
objectives. Five more tests were conducted the
following year to confirm the adequacy of such
testing for nuclear weapons development.
In November 1958, public concern over radioac-
tive fallout brought about a nuclear testing morato-
rium that lasted nearly 3 years. After the United
States resumed testing in September, 1961, almost
all testing in Nevada was done underground, while
atmospheric testing was conducted in the Christmas
Island and Johnston Island area of the Pacific. From
1961 through 1963, many of the underground tests
vented radioactive material. The amounts were
small, however, in comparison to releases from
aboveground testing also occurring at that time.
With the success of the Rainier test, efforts were
made to understand the basic phenomenology of
contained underground explosions. Field efforts
included tunneling into the radioactive zone, labora-
tory measurements, and theoretical work to model
the containment process. Through additional tests,
experience was gained in tunnel-stemming proc-
esses and the effects of changing yields. The early
attempts to explain the physical reason why under-
ground nuclear explosions do not always fracture
rock to the surface did little more than postulate the
hypothetical existence of a "mystical magical mem-
brane." In fact, it took more than a decade of
underground testing before theories for the physical
basis for containment were developed.
In 1963, U.S. atmospheric testing ended when the
United States signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty
prohibiting nuclear test explosions in any environ-
ment other than underground. The treaty also
prohibits any explosion that:
. . . causes radioactive debris to be present outside
the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.^
With the venting of radioactive debris from
underground explosions restricted by treaty, con-
tainment techniques improved. Although many U.S.
tests continued to produce accidental releases of
radioactive material, most releases were only detect-
able within the boundaries of the Nevada Test Site.
In 1970, however, a test codenamed "Baneberry"
resulted in a prompt, massive venting. Radioactive
material from Baneberry was tracked as far as the
Canadian border and focused concern about both the
environmental safety and the treaty compliance of
'The firsl underground lest wa.s the United Stales' lOOth nuclear explosion.
^It is interesting to note that even with an open shaft, 90% of the fission products created by Pascal-A were contained underground.
^Article I, Kb). 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
-31-
32 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
the testing program.'* Testing was suspended for 7
months while a detailed examination of testing
practices was conducted by the Atomic Energy
Commission. The examination resulted in new
testing procedures and specific recommendations
for review of test containment. The procedures
initiated as a consequence of Baneberry are the basis
of present-day testing practices.
Today, safety is an overriding concern throughout
every step in the planning and execution of an
underground nuclear test. Underground nuclear test
explosions are designed to be contained, reviewed
for containment, and conducted to minimize even
the most remote chance of an accidental release of
radioactive material. Each step of the testing author-
ization procedure is concerned with safety; and
conservatism and redundancy are built into the
system.-^
WHAT HAPPENS DURING AN
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION
The detonation of a nuclear explosion under-
ground creates phenomena that occur within the
following time fi^ames:
Microseconds
Within a microsecond (one-millionth of a sec-
ond), the billions of atoms involved in a nuclear
explosion release their energy. Pressures within the
exploding nuclear weapon reach several million
pounds per square inch; and temperatures are as high
as 100 million degrees Centigrade. A strong shock
wave is created by the explosion and moves outward
from the point of detonation.
Milliseconds
Within tens of milliseconds (thousandths of a
second), the metal canister and surrounding rock are
vaporized, creating a bubble of high pressure steam
and gas. A cavity is then formed both by the pressure
of the gas bubble and by the explosive momentum
imparted to the surrounding rock.
Tenths of a Second
As the cavity continues to expand, the intemal
pressure decreases. Within a few tenths of a second,
the pressure has dropped to a level roughly compara-
ble to the weight of the overlying rock. At this point,
the cavity has reached its largest size and can no
longer grow.^ Meanwhile, the shock wave created by
the explosion has traveled outward from the cavity,
crushing and fracturing rock. Eventually, the shock
wave weakens to the point where the rock is no
longer crushed, but is merely compressed and then
returns to its original state. This compression and
relaxation phase becomes seismic waves that travel
through the Earth in the same manner as seismic
waves formed by an earthquake.
A Few Seconds
After a few seconds, the molten rock begins to
collect and solidify in a puddle at the bottom of the
cavity.^ Eventually, cooling causes the gas pressure
within the cavity to decrease.
Minutes to Days
When the gas pressure in the cavity declines to the
point where it is no longer able to support the
overlying rock, the cavity may collapse. The col-
lapse occurs as overlying rock breaks into rubble and
falls into the cavity void. As the process continues,
the void region moves upward as rubble falls
downward. The "chimneying" continues until:
• the void volume within the chimney completely
fills with loose rubble.
• the chimney reaches a level where the shape of
the void region and the strength of the rock can
support the overburden material, or
• the chimney reaches the surface.
If the chimney reaches the surface, the ground sinks
forming a saucer-like subsidence crater. Cavity
collapse and chimney formation typically occur
within a few hours of the detonation but sometimes
take days or months.
■•See for example, Bruce A. Bolt, Nuclear Explosions and Earthquakes San Francisco, CA. (W.H. Freeman & Co., 1976).
'See "Detonation Authority and Procedures" (ch. 2).
*See the next section, "How explosions remain contained," for a detailed explanation of cavity formation.
''The solidified rock contains most of the radioactive products from the explosion. The performance of the nuclear weapon is analyzed when samples
of this material are recovered by drilling back into the cavity.
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 33
Box 3-A — Baneberry
The exact cause of the 1970 Banebeny venting still remains a mystery. The original explanation postulated
the existence of an undetected water table. It assumed that the high temperatures of the explosion produced steam
that vented to the surface. Later analysis, however, discredited this explanation and proposed an alternative scenario
based on three geologic features of the Baneberry site: water-saturated clay, a buried scarp of hard rock, and a nearby
fault. It is thought that the weak, water-saturated clay was unable to support the containment structure: the hard scarp
strongly reflected back the energy of the explosion increasing its force; and the nearby fault provided a pathway
that gases could travel along. All three of these features seem to have contributed to the venting. Whatever its cause,
the Baneberry venting increased attention on containment and, in doing so, marked the beginning of the present-day
containment practices.
Photo credit: Department of Energy
The venting of Baneberry. 1970.
34 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit Harold E. Edgerton
Early phase of fireball from nuclear explosion.
WHY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
REMAIN CONTAINED
Radioactive material produced by a nuclear ex-
plosion remains underground due to the combined
efforts of:
• the sealing nature of compressed rock around
the cavity,
• the porosity of the rock,
• the depth of burial,
• the strength of the rock, and
• the stemming of the emplacement hole.
Counter to intuition, only minimal rock
strength is required for containment.
At first, the explosion creates a pressurized cavity
filled with gas that is mostly steam. As the cavity
pushes outward, the surrounding rock is compressed
(figure 3- 1(a)). Because there is essentially a fixed
quantity of gas within the cavity, the pressure
decreases as the cavity expands. Eventually the
pressure drops below the level required to deform
the surrounding material (figure 3-1 (b)). Mean-
while, the shock wave has imparted outward motion
to the material around the cavity. Once the shock
wave has passed, however, the material tries to
return (rebound) to its original position (figure
3-1 (c)). The rebound creates a large compressive
stress field, called a stress '"containment cage",
around the cavity (figure 3- 1(d)). The physics of the
stress containment cage is somewhat analogous to
how stone archways support themselves. In the case
of a stone archway, the weight of each stone pushes
against the others and supports the archway. In the
case of an underground explosion, the rebounded
rock locks around the cavity forming a stress field
that is stronger than the pressure inside the cavity.
The stress "containment cage" closes any fractures
that may have begun and prevents new fractures
from forming.
The predominantly steam-filled cavity eventually
collapses forming a chimney. When collapse occurs,
the steam in the cavity is condensed through contact
with the cold rock falling into the cavity. The
noncondensible gases remain within the lower
chimney at low pressure. Once collapse occurs,
high-pressure steam is no longer present to drive
gases from the cavity region to the surface.
If the test is conducted in porous material, such as
alluvium or tuff, the porosity of the medium will
provide volume to absorb gases produced by the
explosion. For example, all of the steam generated
by a 150 kiloton explosion beneath the water table
can be contained in a condensed state within the
volume of pore space that exists in a hemispherical
pile of alluvium 200 to 300 feet high. Although most
steam condenses before leaving the cavity region,
the porosity helps to contain noncondensible gases
such as carbon dioxide (COi) and hydrogen (H,).
The gas diffuses into the interconnected pore space
and the pressure is reduced to a level that is too low
to drive the fractures. The deep water table and high
porosity of rocks at the Nevada Test Site facilitate
containment.
Containment also occurs because of the pressure
of overlying rock. The depth of burial provides a
stress that limits fracture growth. For example, as a
fracture initiated from the cavity grows, gas seeps
from the fracture into the surrounding material.
Eventually, the pressure within the fracture de-
creases below what is needed to extend the fracture.
At this point, growth of the fracture stops and the gas
simply leaks into the surrounding material.
Rock strength is also an important aspect of
containment, but only in the sense that an extremely
weak rock (such as water-saturated clay) cannot
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 35
Figure 3-1— Formation of Stress "Containment Cage"
Compressive residual stress
1 ) Cavity expands outward and deforms surrounding rock. 2) Natural resistance to deformation stops expansion. 3) Cavity contracts
(rebounds) from elastic unloading of distant rock. 4) Rebound locks in compressive residual stress around cavity.
SOURCE: Modified from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
support a stress containment cage. Detonation within
weak, saturated clay is thought to have been a factor
in the release of the Baneberry test. As a result, sites
containing large amounts of water-saturated clay are
now avoided.
The final aspect of containment is the stemming
that is put in a vertical hole after the nuclear device
has been emplaced. Stemming is designed to prevent
gas from traveling up the emplacement hole. Imper-
meable plugs, located at various distances along the
stemming column, force the gases into the surround-
ing rock where it is "sponged up" in the pore spaces.
How the various containment features perform
depends on many variables: the size of the explo-
sion, the depth of burial, the water content of the
rock, the geologic structure, etc. Problems may
occur when the containment cage does not form
completely and gas from the cavity flows either
through the emplacement hole or the overburden
material.* When the cavity collapses, the steam
condenses and only noncondensible gases such as
carbon dioxide (COj) and hydrogen (Hj) remain in
the cavity.^ The COj and H, remain in the chimney
if there is available pore space. If the quantity of
noncondensible gases is large, however, they can act
as a driving force to transport radioactivity through
the chimney or the overlying rock. Consequently,
the amount of carbonate material and water in the
rock near the explosion and the amount of iron
available for reaction are considered when evaluat-
ing containment."^
SELECTING LOCATION, DEPTH,
AND SPACING
The site for conducting a nuclear test is, at first,
selected only on a tentative basis. The final decision
is made after various site characteristics have been
reviewed. The location, depth of burial, and spacing
are based on the maximum expected yield for the
nuclear device, the required geometry of the test, and
the practical considerations of scheduling, conven-
ience, and available holes. If none of the inventory
holes are suitable, a site is selected and a hole
drilled."
The first scale for determining how deep an
explosion should be buried was derived from the
Rainier test in 1957. The depth, based on the cube
root of the yield, was originally:
Depth = 300 (yield) '^'•
where depth was measured in feet and yield in
*Lackof a stress "coniainment cage" may not be a serious problem if the medium is sufficently porous or if the deptli of burial is sufficent.
'Ttie COt is formed from tlie vaporization of carbonate material; while the H, is formed when water reacts with the iron in the nuclear device and
diagnostics equipment.
"The carbonate material in Frenchman Rat created CO, that is thought to have caused a seep during the Diagonal Line test (Nov. 24, 1 97 1 ). Diagonal
Line was the last test on Frenchman Flat; the area is currently considered impractical for underground testing largely because of the carbonate matenal.
"See ch. 2, "The Nevada Test Site." for a description of the areas each Laboratory uses for testing.
36 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit Department ol Energy
Blanca containment failure, 1958.
kilotons. The first few tests after Rainier, however,
were detonated at greater depths than this formula
requires because it was more convenient to mine
tunnels deeper in the Mesa. It was not until
"Blanca," October 30, 1958, that a test was
conducted exactly at 300 (yield) ^' feet to test the
depth scale. The containment of the Blanca explo-
sion, however, was unsuccessful and resulted in a
surface venting of radioactive material. As a conse-
quence, the depth scale was modified to include the
addition of a few hundred feet as a safety factor and
thus became: 300 (yield)'^^
feet."
"plus-a-few-hundred-
Today, the general depth of burial can be approxi-
mated by the equation:
Depth = 400 (yield)'-",
where depth is measured in feet and yield in
kilotons.'^ The minimum depth of burial, however,
is 600 feet.'^ Consequently, depths of burial vary
from 600 feet for a low-yield device, to about 2.1(X)
feet for a large-yield test. The depth is scaled to the
'^"Public Safely for Nuclear Weapons Tests," United Slates Envirorunenlal Protection Agency, January, 1984.
"The 600-foot depth was chosen as a minimum after a statistical study showed that the lilscUhoodof a seep of radioactive material to the surface for
explosions buried 600 feet or more was about 1/2 as great as for explosions at less than 5(X) feet, even if they were buried at the same scale-depth in
each case.
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 37
"maximum credible yield" that the nuclear device
is thought physically capable of producing, not to
the design yield or most likely yield.''*
Whether a test will be conducted on Pahute Mesa
or Yucca Flat depends on the maximum credible
yield. Yucca Flat is closer to support facilities and
therefore more convenient, while the deep water
table at Pahute Mesa is more economical for large
yield tests that need deep, large diameter emplace-
ment holes. Large yield tests in small diameter holes
(less than 7 feet) can be conducted in Yucca Flat. A
test area may also be chosen to avoid scheduling
conflicts that might result in a test damaging the hole
or diagnostic equipment of another nearby test. Once
the area has been chosen, several candidate sites are
selected based on such features as: proximity to
previous tests or existing drill holes; geologic
features such as faults, depth to basement rock, and
the presence of clays or carbonate materials; and
practical considerations such as proximity to power
lines, roads, etc.
In areas well suited for testing, an additional site
selection restriction is the proximity to previous
tests. For vertical drill hole tests, the minimum shot
separation distance is about one-half the depth of
burial for the new shot (figure 3-2). For shallow
shots, this separation distance allows tests to be
spaced so close together that in some cases, the
surface collapse craters coalesce. The V2 depth of
burial distance is a convention of convenience,
rather than a criteron for containment.'"' It is, for
example, difficult to safely place a drilling rig too
close to an existing collapse crater.
Horizontal tunnel tests are generally spaced with
a minimum shot separation distance of twice the
combined cavity radius plus ICX) feet, measured
from the point of detonation (called the "working
point") (figure 3-3). In other words, two tests with
100 foot radius cavities would be separated by 300
feet between cavities, or 500 feet (center to center).
The size of a cavity formed by an explosion is
proportional to the cube root of the yield and can be
estimated by:
Radius = 55 (yield) '^^
where the radius is measured in feet and the yield in
kilotons. For example, an 8 kiloton explosion would
be expected to produce an underground cavity with
approximately a 110 foot radius. Two such test
explosions would require a minimum separation
distance of 320 feet between cavities or 540 feet
between working points.
Occasionally, a hole or tunnel is found to be
unsuitable for the proposed test. Such a situation,
however, is rare, occurring at a rate of about 1 out of
25 for a drill hole test and about 1 out of 15 for a
tunnel test.'^ Usually, a particular hole that is found
unacceptable for one test can be used for another test
at a lower yield.
REVIEWING A TEST SITE
LOCATION
Once the general parameters for a drill-hole have
been selected, the sponsoring laboratory requests a
pre-drill Geologic Data Summary (CDS) from the
U.S. Geological Survey. The GDS is a geologic
interpretation of the area that reviews the three basic
elements: the structures, the rock type, and the water
content. The U.S. Geological Survey looks for
features that have caused containment problems in
the past. Of particular concern is the presence of any
faults that might become pathways for the release of
radioactive material, and the close location of hard
basement rock that may reflect the energy created by
the explosion. Review of the rock type checks for
features such as clay content which would indicate
a weak area where it may be difficult for the hole to
remain intact, and the presence of carbonate rock
that could produce COj. Water content is also
reviewed to predict the amount of steam and Hj that
might be produced. If the geology indicates less than
ideal conditions, alternate locations may be sug-
gested that vary from less than a few hundred feet
from the proposed site to an entirely different area of
the test site.
When the final site location is drilled, data are
collected and evaluated by the sponsoring labora-
tory. Samples and geophysical logs, including down-
hole photography, are collected and analyzed. The
U.S. Geological Survey reviews the data, consults
with the laboratory throughout the process, and
reviews the accuracy of the geologic interpretations.
'"•In many cases the maximum credible yield is significantly larger than the expected yield for a nuclear device.
"As discussed later, testing in previously fractured rock is not considered a containment risk in most instances.
'*On three occasions tunnels have been abandoned because of unanticipated conditions such as the discovery of a fault or the presence of too much
38 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 3-2 — Minimum Shot Separation for Driil Hole Tests
Vi depth of burial
Diagram to approximate scale
Scale Illustration of tfie minimum separation distance (1/2 depth of burial) for vertical drill fiole tests. Tfie
deptli of burial is based on the maximum credible yield.
SOURCE: Office of Tectinology Assessment. 1989
To confirm the accuracy of the geologic description
and review and evaluate containment considera-
tions, the Survey also attends the host laboratory's
site proposal presentation to the Containment Evalu-
ation Panel.
CONTAINMENT EVALUATION
PANEL
One consequence of the Baneberry review was the
restructuring of what was then called the Test
Evaluation Panel. The panel was reorganized and
new members with a wider range of geologic and
hydrologic expertise were added. The new panel was
named the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP);
and their first meeting was held in March, 1971.
The Containment Evaluation Panel presently
consists of a Chairman and up to 1 1 panel members.
Six of the panel members are representatives from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Defense Nuclear Agency, San-
dia National Laboratory, U.S. Geological Survey,
and the Desert Research Institute. An additional 3 to
5 members are also included for their expertise in
disciplines related to containment. The chairman of
the panel is appointed by the Manager of Nevada
Operations (Department of Energy), and panel
members are nominated by the member institution
with the concurrence of the chairman and approval
of the Manager. The panel reports to the Manager of
Nevada Operations.
Practices of the Containment Evaluation Panel
have evolved throughout the past 1 8 years; however,
their purpose, as described by the Containment
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 39
Figure 3-3— Minimum Shot Separation for Tunnei Tests
Tunnel tests are typically
overburied. Collapse ctiimneys
do not usually extend to surface.
Diagram to approxinnate scale
Scale illustration of the minimum separation distance (2 combined cavity radii plus 100 feet) for
horizontal tunnel tests. Tunnel tests are typically overburied. Collapse chimneys do not usually extend
to the surface.
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1989
Evaluation Charter, remains specifically defined as
follows:'^
1. evaluate, as an independent organization re-
porting to the Manager of Nevada Operations,
the containment design of each proposed
nuclear test;
2. assure that all relevant data available for
proper evaluation are considered;
3. advise the manager of Nevada Operations of
the technical adequacy of such design from the
viewpoint of containment, thus providing the
manager a basis on which to request detona-
tion authority; and
4. maintain a historical record of each evaluation
and of the data, proceedings, and discussions
pertaining thereto.
Although the CEP is charged with rendering a
judgment as to the adequacy of the design of the
containment, the panel does not vote. Each member
provides his independent judgment as to the pros-
pect of containment, usually addressing his own area
of expertise but free to comment on any aspect of the
test. The Chairman is in charge of summarizing
these statements in a recommendation to the man-
ager on whether to proceed with the lest, based only
on the containment aspects. Containment Evalua-
tion Panel guidelines instruct members to make their
judgments in such a way that:
"Containment Evaluation Charter, June 1, 1986, Section II.
40 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Considerations of cost, schedules, and test objectives
shall not enter into the review of the technical
adequacy of any test from the viewpoint of contain-
ment.'*
Along with their judgments on containment, each
panel member evaluates the probability of contain-
ment using the following four categories:'^
1. Category A: Considering all containment fea-
tures and appropriate historical, empirical, and
analytical data, the best judgment of the
member indicates a high confidence in suc-
cessful containment as defined in VIII. F.
below.
2. Category B: Considering all containment fea-
tures and appropriate historical, empirical, and
analytical data, the best judgment of the
member indicates a less, but still adequate,
degree of confidence in successful contain-
ment as defined in VIII. F. below.
3. Category C: Considering all containment fea-
tures and appropriate historical, empirical, and
analytical data, the best judgment of the
member indicates some doubt that successful
containment, as described in VIII.F. below,
will be achieved.
4. Unable to Categorize
Successful containment is defined for the CEP as:
... no radioactivity detectable off-site as measured
by normal monitoring equipment and no unantici-
pated release of activity on-site.
The Containment Evaluation Panel does not have
the direct authority to prevent a test from being
conducted. Their judgment, both as individuals and
as suinmarized by the Chairman, is presented to the
Manager. The Manager makes the decision as to
whether a Detonation Authority Request will be
made. The statements and categorization from each
CEP member are included as part of the permanent
Detonation Authority Request.
Although the panel only advises the Manager, it
would be unlikely for the Manager to request
detonation if the request included a judgment by the
CEP that the explosion might not be contained. The
record indicates the influence of the CEP. Since
formation of the panel in 1970, there has never been
a Detonation Authority Request submitted for ap-
proval with a containment plan that received a "C"
("some doubt") categorization from even one
member. ^'^-'
The Containment Evaluation Panel serves ar.
additional role in improving containment as a
consequence of their meetings. The discussions of
the CEP provide an ongoing forum for technical
discussions of containment concepts and practices.
As a consequence, general improvements to contain-
ment design have evolved through the panel discus-
sions and debate.
CONTAINING VERTICAL
SHAFT TESTS
Once a hole has been selected and reviewed, a
stemming plan is made for the individual hole. The
stemming plan is usually formulated by adapting
previously successful stemming plans to the particu-
larities of a given hole. The objective of the plan is
to prevent the emplacement hole from being the path
of least resistance for the flow of radioactive
material. In doing so, the stemming plan must take
into account the possibility of only a partial collapse:
if the chimney collapse extends only half way to the
surface, the stemming above the collapse must
remain intact.
Lowering the nuclear device with the diagnostics
down the emplacement hole can take up to 5 days.
A typical test will have between 50 and 250
diagnostic cables with diameters as great as P/s
inches packaged in bundles through the stemming
column. After the nuclear device is lowered into the
emplacement hole, the stemming is installed. Figure
3-4 shows a typical stemming plan for a Lawrence
"Containment Evaluation Panel Charter. June 1. 1986. Section HID.
"Containment Evaluation Panel Charter, June 1, 1986, Section VII.
^'The grading system for containment plans has evolved since the early 1970's. Prior to April, 1977, the Containment Evaluation Panel categorized
tests using the Roman numerals (I-IV) where I-lII had about the same meaning as A-C and IV was a D which eveniually was dropped as a letter and
just became "unable to categorize."
^'However, one shot (Mundo) was submitted with an "unable to categorize" categorization. Mundo was a joint US-UK test conducted on May 1.
1984.
Chapters — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions •41
Figure 3-4— "Typical" Stemming Plan
Cable gas blocks
(Diagram not to scale)
Typical stemming sequence of coarse material, fine material, and
sanded gypsum plug used by Lawrence LIvermore National
Laboratory for vertical drill hole tests.
SOURCE: Modified from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore test with six sanded gypsum concrete
plugs. ■^■^ The plugs have two purposes: 1) to impede
gas flow, and 2) to serve as structural platforms that
prevent the stemming from falling out if only a
partial collapse occurs. Under each plug is a layer of
sand-size fine material. The sand provides a base for
the plug. Alternating between the plugs and the
fines, coarse gravel is used to fill in the rest of the
stemming. The typical repeating pattern used for
stemming by Los ALamos, for example, is 50 feet of
gravel, 1 feet of sand, and a plug.
All the diagnostic cables from the nuclear device
are blocked to prevent gas from finding a pathway
through the cables and traveling to the surface. Cable
fan-out zones physically separate the cables at plugs
so that the grout and fines can seal between them.
Frequently, radiation detectors are installed between
plugs to monitor the post-shot flow of radiation
through the stemming column.
CONTAINING HORIZONTAL
TUNNEL TESTS
The containment of a horizontal tunnel test is
different from the containment of a vertical drill hole
test because the experimental apparatus is intended
to be recovered. In most tests, the objective is to
allow direct radiation from a nuclear explosion to
reach the experiment, but prevent the explosive
debris and fission products from destroying it.
Therefore, the containment is designed for two
tasks: 1) to prevent the uncontrolled release of
radioactive material into the atmosphere for public
safety, and 2) to prevent explosive debris from
reaching the experimental test chamber.
Both types of horizontal tunnel tests (effects tests
and cavity tests) use the same containment concept
of three redundant containment "vessels" that nest
inside each other and are separated by plugs (figure
3-5).^^ Each vessel is designed to independently
contain the nuclear explosion, even if the other
vessels fail. If, for example, gas leaks from vessel I
into vessel II, vessel II has a volume large enough so
that the resulting gas temperatures and pressures
would be well within the limits that the plugs are
designed to withstand. The vessels are organized as
follows:
Vessel I is designed to protect the experiment by
preventing damage to the equipment and allowing it
to be recovered.
Vessel II is designed to protect the tunnel system
so that it can be reused even if vessel I fails and the
experimental equipment is lost.
Vessel III is designed purely for containment,
such that even if the experimental equipment is lost
and the tunnel system contaminated, radioactive
material will not escape to the atmosphere.
In addition to the three containment vessels, there
is a gas seal door at the entrance of the tunnel system
that serves as an additional safety measure. The gas
seal door is closed prior to detonation and the area
^^Allhough Livermore and Ixis Alamos use the same general stemming philosophy, there are some differences: For example, Livermore uses sanded
gypsum concrete plugs while Los Alamos uses plugs made of epoxy. Also, Livermore uses an emplacement pipe for lowering the device downhole. while
IjOs Alamos lowers the device and diagnostic cannister on a wire rope harness.
^^See ch. 2 for a discussion of types of nuclear tests.
42 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 3-5 — Three Redundant Containment Vessels (Plan View)
Tunnel
entrance
Ca^i^V
\y
Three containment vessels tor the Migtity Oak Test conducted in ttie T-Tunnel Complex.
SOURCE: Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency.
between it and the vessel III plug is pressuiized to
approximately 10 pounds per square inch.
The plugs that separate the vessels are constructed
of high strength grout or concrete 10 to 30 feet thick.
The sides of the vessel II plugs facing the working
point are constructed of steel. Vessel II plugs are
designed to withstand pressures up to 1 .000 pounds
per square inch and temperatures up to 1,000 °F.
Vessel III plugs are constructed of massive concrete
and are designed to withstand pressures up to 500
pounds per square inch and temperatures up to 500
T.
Before each test, the tunnel system is checked for
leaks. The entire system is closed off and pressurized
to 2 pounds per square inch with a gas containing
tracers in it. The surrounding area is then monitored
for the presence of the tracer gas. Frequently, the
chimney formed by the explosion is also subjected
to a post-shot pressurization test to ensure that no
radioactive material could leak through the chimney
to the surface.
The structure of vessel I. as shown in figure 3-6,
is designed to withstand the effects of ground shock
and contain the pressure, temperatures, and radiation
of the explosion. The nuclear explosive is located at
the working point, also known as the "zero room."
A long, tapered, horizontal line-of-sight (HLOS)
pipe extends 1 ,000 feet or more from the working
point to the test chamber where the experimental
equipment is located. The diameter of the pipe may
only be a few inches at the working point, but
typically increases to about 10 feet before it reaches
Chapter S — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 43
Figure 3-6— Vessel I
End of stemming
^ '^
Test ctiamber
End of stemming
Key: GSAC =gas seal auxiliary closure; MAC = modified auxiliary
closure; TAPS = Tunnel and pipe seal
The HLOS Vessel I is designed to protect tfie experimental
equipment after allowing radiation to travel down the pipe.
SOURCE; Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency
the test chamber. ^'^ The entire pipe is vacuum
pumped to simulate the conditions of space and to
minimize the attenuation of radiation. The bypass
drift (an access tunnel), located next to the line of
sight pipe, is created to provide access to the closures
and to different parts of the tunnel system. These
drifts allow for the nuclear device to be placed in the
zero room and for late-time emplacement of test
equipment. After the device has been emplaced at
the working point, the bypass drift is completely
filled with grout. After the experiment, parts of the
bypass drift will be reexcavated to permit access to
the tunnel system to recover the pipe and experimen-
tal equipment.
The area around the HLOS pipe is also filled with
grout, leaving only the HLOS pipe as a clear
pathway between the explosion and the test cham-
ber. Near the explosion, grout with properties similar
to the surrounding rock is used so as not to interfere
with the formation of the stress containment cage.
Near the end of the pipe strong grout or concrete is
used to support the pipe and closures. In between,
the stemming is filled with super-lean grout de-
signed to flow under moderate stress. The super-lean
grout is designed to fill in and effectively plug any
fractures that may form as the ground shock
collapses the pipe and creates a stemming plug.
As illustrated in figure 3-6, the principal compo-
nents of an HLOS pipe system include a working
point room, a muffler, a modified auxiliary closure
(MAC), a gas seal auxiliary closure (GSAC), and a
tunnel and pipe seal (TAPS). All these closures are
installed primarily to protect the experimental equip-
ment. The closures are designed to shut off the pipe
after the radiation created by the explosion has
traveled down to the test chamber, but before
material from the blast can fly down the pipe and
destroy the equipment.
The working point room is a box designed to
house the nuclear device. The muffler is an ex-
panded region of the HLOS pipe that is designed to
reduce flow down the pipe by allowing expansion
and creating turbulence and stagnation. The MAC
(figure 3-7(a)) is a heavy steel housing that contains
two 12-inch-thick forged-aluminum doors designed
to close openings up to 84 inches in diameter. The
doors are installed opposite each other, perpendicu-
lar to the pipe. The doors are shut by high pressure
gas that is triggered at the time of detonation.
Although the doors close completely within 0.03
seconds (overlapping so that each door fills the
tunnel), in half that time they have met in the middle
and obscure the pipe. The GSAC is similar to the
MAC except that it is designed to provide a gas-tight
closure. The TAPS closure weighs 40 tons and the
design (figure 3-7(b)) resembles a large toilet seat.
The door, which weighs up to 9 tons, is hinged on the
top edge and held in the horizontal (open) position.
When the door is released, it swings down by gravity
and slams shut in about 0.75 seconds. Any pressure
remaining in the pipe pushes on the door making the
seal tighter. The MAC and GSAC will withstand
pressures up to 10,000 pounds per square inch. The
TAPS is designed to withstand pressures up to 1 .000
pounds per square inch, and temperatures up to
1,000 T.
When the explosion is detonated radiation travels
down the HLOS pipe at the speed of light. The
containment process (figure 3-8(a-e), triggered at the
time of detonation, occurs in the following sequence
to protect experimental equipment and contain
radioactive material produced by the explosion:
• After 0.03 seconds (b), the cavity created by the
explosion expands and the shock wave moves
away from the working point and approaches
the MAC. The shock wave collapses the pipe,
squeezing it shut, and forms a stemming
"plug." Both the MAC and the GSAC shut off
^■•On occasion, the diameter of the pipe has increased lo 20 feet.
44 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 3-7— Vessel I Closures
■ Mechanical closures
(MAC/GSAC)
Mechanical closure
(TAPS)
Pre-fire geometry
Approximate closed FAC geometry
Fast acting closure
(FAC)
A) Mechanical Closures (MAC/GSAC)
B) Tunnel and Pipe Seal (TAPS)
C) Fast Acting Closure (FAC)
SOURCE: Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency.
the pipe ahead of the shock wave to prevent
early flow of high-velocity gas and debris into
the experiment chamber.
• After 0.05 seconds (c), the ground shock moves
past the second closure and is no longer strong
enough to squeeze the pipe shut. The stemming
plug stops forming at about the distance where
the first mechanical pipe closure is located.
After 0.2 seconds (d), the cavity growth is
complete. The rebound from the explosion
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 45
A Zero
lime
Figure 3-8 — Tunnel Closure Sequence
D i
Working point Mulller
Ground
shock
Stemnning ^i\
plug "
I
LOS pipe
Mechanical closure(TAPS)
Mechanical closure(GSAC|
Mechanical closure(MACl
Mechanical closure! TAPS)
Mechanical closure(GSAC)
Mechanical closure(MAC)
Test channber
End of stemming
^sE^Mh
End of stemming
Mechanical closure(TAPS| | Test chamber
Mechanical closure(GSAC) End of stemming
'#/
Mechanical closure(MAC)
Mechanical closure(TAPS) I Test chamber
Mechanical closure(GSAC) End of stemming
Mechanical closure(MAC)
75
seconds
Mechanical closure(TAPS)
Mechanical closure(GSAC)
Mechanical closure(MAC)
Test chamber
End of stemming
A) Zero Time: Explosion is detonated and the first two mechanical closures are fired. B) Within 0.03 seconds, a stemming plug is being
formed and mechanical pipe closure has occurred. C) Within 0.05 seconds, the stemming plug has formed. D) Within 0.2 seconds, cavity
growth is complete and a surrounding compressive residual stress field has formed. E) Within 0.75 seconds, closure is complete.
SOURCE: Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency.
46 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
locks in the residual stress field, thereby
forming a containment cage. The shock wave
passes the test chamber.
• After 0.75 seconds (e). the final mechanical seal
(TAPS) closes, preventing late-time explosive
and radioactive gases from entering the test
chamber.
The entire closure process for containment takes
less than ^A of a second. Because the tests are
typically buried at a depth greater than necessary for
containment, the chimney does not reach the surface
and a collapse crater normally does not form. A
typical post-shot chimney configuration with its
approximate boundaries is shown in figure 3-9.
In lower yield tests, such as those conducted in the
P-tunnel complex, the first mechanical closure is a
Fast Acting Closure (FAC) rather than a MAC.^^
The FAC (figure 3-7(c)) closes in 0.001 seconds and
can withstand pressures of 30,000 pounds per square
inch. The FAC acts like a cork, blocking off the
HLOS pipe early, and preventing debris and stem-
ming material from flying down the pipe. A similar
closure is currently being developed for larger yield
tunnel tests.
TYPES OF RADIATION RELEASES
Terms describing the release or containment of
underground nuclear explosions have been refined
to account for the volume of the material and the
conditions of the release. The commonly used terms
are described below.
Containment Failure
Containment failures are releases of radioactive
material that do not fall within the strict definition of
successful containment, which is described by the
Department of Energy as:
Containment such that a test results in no radioac-
tivity detectable off site as measured by normal
monitoring equipment and no unanticipated release
of radioactivity onsite. Detection of noble gases that
apjiear onsite long after an event, due to changing
atmospheric conditions, is not unanticipated. Antici-
pated releases will be designed to conform to
specific guidance from DOE/HQ.^*'
Containment failures are commonly described as:
Figure 3-9— Typical Post-Shot Configuration
Tunnel
complex
Tunnel shots are typically overburied and the collapse chimney
rarely extends to the surface.
SOURCE: Modified from Defense Nuclear Agency.
Ventings
Ventings are prompt, massive, uncontrolled re-
leases of radioactive material. They are character-
ized as active releases under pressure, such as when
radioactive material is driven out of the ground by
steam or gas. "Baneberry," in 1970, is the last
example of an explosion that "vented."
Seeps
Seeps, which are not visible, can only be detected
by measuring for radiation. Seeps are characterized
as uncontrolled slow releases of radioactive material
with little or no energy.
Late-Time Seep
Late-time seeps are small releases of nonconden-
sable gases that usually occur days or weeks after a
vertical drill hole test. The noncondensable gases
diffuse up through the pore spaces of the overlying
rock and are thought to be drawn to the surface by a
decrease in atmospheric pressure (called "atmos-
pheric pumping").
^-''The P-iunnel complex is mined in Aqueducl Mesa and has less overburden than the N-tunnel complex in Rainier Mesa. Therefore, P-lunnel is
generally used for lower yield tests.
^Section VIII. F, Containment Evaluation Panel Charter.
Chapters — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions •47
Photo credit: David Graham
Fast acting closure.
Controlled Tunnel Purging
Controlled tunnel purging is an intentional release
of radioactive material to recover experimental
equipment and ventilate test tunnels. During a
controlled tunnel purging, gases from the tunnel are
filtered, mixed with air to reduce the concentration,
and released over time when weather conditions are
favorable for dispersion into sparsely populated
areas.
Operational Release
Operational releases are small releases of radioac-
tivity resulting from operational aspects of vertical
drill hole tests. Activities that often result in
operational releases include: drilling back down to
the location of the explosion to collect core samples
(called "drill back"), collecting gas samples from
the explosion (called "gas sampling"), and sealing
the drill back holes (called "cement back")
RECORD OF CONTAINMENT
The containment of underground nuclear explo-
sions is a process that has continually evolved
through learning, experimentation, and experience.
The record of containment illustrates the various
types of releases and their relative impact.
Containment Evaluation Panel
The Containment Evaluation Panel defines suc-
cessful containment as no radioactivity detectable
offsite and no unanticipated release of activity
ensile. By this definition, the CEP has failed to
predict unsuccessful containment on four occasions
since 1970:
48 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Camphor: June 29, 1971, horizontal tunnel test,
less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity de-
tected only on-site.
Diagonal Line: Novemt)er 24, 1971, vertical shaft test,
less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity de-
tected off-site.
Riola: September 25, 1980, vertical shaft test,
less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity de-
tected off-site.
Agrini: March 31, 1984, vertical shaft test, less
than 20 kilotons, radioactivity detected
only on-site.
These are the only tests (out of more than 200)
where radioactive material has been unintentionally
released to the atmosphere due to containment
failure. In only two of the cases was the radioactivity
detected outside the geographic boundary of the
Nevada Test Site.
There have, however, been several other instances
where conditions developed that were not expected.
For example, during the Midas Myth test on
February 15, 1984, an unexpected collapse crater
occurred above the test tunnel causing injuries to
personnel. In addition, the tunnel partially collapsed,
damaging experimental equipment. During the Mighty
Oak test on April 10, 1986, radioactive material
penetrated through two of the three containment
vessels. Experimental equipment worth $32 million
was destroyed and the tunnel system ventilation
required a large controlled release of radioactive
material (table 3-1). In the case of Midas Myth, no
radioactive material was released (in fact, all radio-
active material was contained within vessel I). In the
case of Mighty Oak, the release of radioactive
material was intentional and controlled. Conse-
quently, neither of these tests are considered con-
tainment failures by the CEP.
Vertical Drill Hole Tests
As discussed previously, vertical drill-hole tests
commonly use a stemming plan with six sanded
gypsum plugs or three epoxy plugs. Approximately
50 percent of the vertical drill hole tests show all
radiation being contained below the first plug. In
some cases, radiation above the plug may not signify
plug failure, but rather may indicate that radioactive
material has traveled through the medium around the
plug-
Table 3-1— Releases From Underground Tests
(normalized to 12 hours after event*)
All releases 1971-1988:
Containment Failures:
Camphor, 1971" 360 Ci
Diagonal Line, 1971 6,800
Riola, 1980 3,100
Agrini, 1 984 690
Late-time Seeps:
Kappeli, 1984 12
Tierra, 1984 600
Labquark, 1986 20
Bodie, 1986^ 52
Controlled Tunnel Purgings:
Hybia Fair, 1974 500
Hybia Gold, 1977 0.005
Miners Iron, 1 980 0.3
Huron Landing, 1 982 280
Mini Jade, 1 983 1
Mill Yard, 1985 5.9
Diamond Beech, 1985 1.1
Misty Rain, 1 985 63
Mighty Oak, 1986 36,000
Mission Ghost, 1987<= 3
Operational Releases:
108 tests from 1970-1988" 5,500
Total since Baneberry: 54,000 Ci
Major pre- 1971 releases:
Platte, 1962 1,900,000 Ci
Eel, 1962 1,900,000
Des Moines, 1962 11,000,000
Baneberry, 1970 6,700,000
26 others from 1958-1970 3,800,000
Total: 25,300,000 Ci
Other Releases for Reference
NTS Atmospheric Testing 1951-1963: . . 12,000,000,000 Ci
1 Kiloton Aboveground Explosion: 10,000,000
Chernobyl (estimate): 81 ,000,000
3R+12 values apply only to containment failures, others are at time of
release
''The Camphor failure includes 140 Ci from tunnel purging,
'^Bodie and Mission Ghost also had drill-back releases.
•^Many of these operational releases are associated with tests that were not
announced
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.
All three of the vertical drill hole tests that
released radioactive material through containment
failure were low yield tests of less than 20 kilotons.
In general, the higher the yield, the less chance there
is that a vertical drill hole test will release radioactiv-
ity.27
Horizontal Tunnel Tests
There have been no uncontrolled releases of
radioactive material detected offsite in the 3 1 tunnel
tests conducted since 1970. Furthermore, all but one
test, Mighty Oak, have allowed successful recovery
"Higher yield tests arc more likely to produce a containment cage and result in the formation of a collapse crater. As discussed earlier in this chapter
"why nuclear explosions remain contained," such features contribute to the containment of the explosion.
Chapter 3 — Containinii; Underground Nuclear Explosions • 49
of the experimental equipment. Mighty Oak and
Camphor are the only tests where radioactivity
escaped out of vessel II. In no test, other than
Camphor, has radioactive material escaped out of
vessel III. Camphor resulted in an uncontrolled
release of radioactive material that was detected
only on site.
There have been several instances when small
amounts of radioactivity were released intentionally
to the atmosphere through controlled purging. In
these cases, the decision was made to vent the tunnel
and release the radioactivity so the experimental
results and equipment could be recovered. The
events that required such a controlled release are the
10 tests where radioactive material escaped out of
vessel I and into vessel II, namely:
Hybla Fair, October 28, 1974.
Hybia Gold, November 1, 1977.
Miners Iron, October 31, 1980.
Huron Landing, September 23, 1982.
Mini Jade, May 26, 1983.
Mill Yard, October 9, 1985.
Diamond Beech, October 9, 1985.
Misty Rain, April 6, 1985.
Mighty Oak, April 10, 1986.
Mission Ghost, June 20, 19872«
In most cases, the release was due to the failure of
some part of the experiment protection system.
Table 3-1 includes every instance (for both
announced and unannounced tests) where radioac-
tive material has reached the atmosphere under any
circumstances whatsoever from 1971 through 1988.
The lower part of table 3-1 summarizes underground
tests prior to 1971 and provides a comparison with
other releases of radioactive material.
Since 1970, 126 tests have resulted in radioactive
material reaching the atmosphere with a total release
of about 54,000 Curies(Ci). Of this amount, 1 1 ,500
Ci were due to containment failure and late-time
seeps. The remaining 42,500 Ci were operational
releases and controlled tunnel ventilations — with
Mighty Oak (36,000 Ci) as the main source. Section
3 of the table shows that the release of radioactive
material from underground nuclear testing since
Baneberry (54,000 Ci) is extremely small in compar-
ison to the amount of material released by pre-
Baneberry underground tests (25,300,000 Ci), the
early atmospheric tests at the Nevada Test Site, or
even the amount that would be released by a
1 -kilolon explosion conducted above ground ( 1 0,000,(X)0
Ci).
From the Perspective of Human Health Risk
If a single person had been standing at the
boundary of the Nevada Test Site in the area of
maximum concentration of radioactivity for every
test since Baneberry (1970), that person's total
exposure would be equivalent to 32 extra minutes
of normal background exposure (or the equiva-
lent of 1/1000 of a single chest x-ray).
A FEW EXAMPLES:
Although over 90 percent of all test explosions
occur as predicted, occasionally something goes
wrong. In some cases, the failure results in the loss
of experimental equipment or requires the controlled
ventilation of a tunnel system. In even more rare
cases (less than 3 percent), the failure results in the
unintentional release of radioactive material to the
atmosphere. A look at examples shows situations
where an unexpected sequence of events contribute
to create an unpredicted situation (as occurred in
Baneberry (see box 3-1)), and also situations where
the full reason for containment failure still remains
a mystery.
1 . Camphor (June 29, 1971 , horizontal tunnel test,
less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity detected only
on-site.)
The ground shock produced by the Camphor
explosion failed to close the HLOS pipe fully. After
about 10 seconds, gases leaked through and eroded
the stemming plug. As gases flowed through the
stemming plug, pressure increased on the closure
door behind the experiment. Gases leaked around
the cable passage ways and eroded open a hole.
Pressure was then placed on the final door, which
held but leaked slightly. Prior to the test, the
containment plan for Camphor received six "I"s
from the CEP.^'*
^*The Mission Ghost release was due lo a posl-shot drill hole.
290p. cit.. footnote 20.
50 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
2. Diagonal Line (November 24, 1971, vertical
shaft test, less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity de-
tected off-site.)
In a sense, the Diagonal Line seep was predicted
by the CEP. Prior to the test. Diagonal Line received
all "A" categorizations, except from one member
who gave it a "B."^'' It was a conclusion of the panel
that due to the high CO, content, a late-time (hours
or days after detonation) seepage was a high
probability. They did not believe, however, that the
level of radiation would be high enough to be
detectable off-site. Permission to detonate was
requested and granted because the test objectives
were judged to outweigh the risk. Diagonal Line was
conducted in the northern part of Frenchman Flat. It
is speculated that carbonate material released COj
gas that forced radioactive material to leak to the
surface. Diagonal Line was the last test detonated on
Frenchman Flat.
3. Riola (September 25, 1980, vertical shaft test,
less than 20 kilotons, radioactivity detected off-site.)
Ironically, Riola was originally proposed for a
different location. The Containment Evaluation
Panel, however, did not approve the first location
and so the test was moved. At its new location, Riola
was characterized by the CEP prior to the test with
8 "A"s. Riola exploded with only a small fraction
of the expected yield. A surface collapse occurred
and the failure of a containment plug resulted in the
release of radioactive material.
4. Agrini (March 31, 1984. vertical shaft test, less
than 20 kilotons, radioactivity detected only on-
site.)
The Agrini explosion formed a deep subsidence
crater 60 feet west of the emplacement hole. A small
amount of radioactive material was pushed through
the chimmney by noncondensible gas pressure and
was detected onsite. The containment plan for
Agrini received seven "A"sandtwo "B"s from the
CEP prior to the test. The "B"s were due to the use
of a new stemming plan.
5. Midas Myth (February 15, 1984, horizontal
tunnel test, less than 20 kilotons, no release of
radioactive material.)
All of the radioactive material produced by the
Midas Myth test was contained within vessel I, with
no release of radioactivity to either the atmosphere
or the tunnel system. It is therefore not considered a
containment failure. Three hours after the lest,
however, the cavity collapsed and the chimney
reached the surface forming an unanticipated subsi-
dence crater. Equipment trailers were damaged and
personnel were injured (one person later died as a
result of complications from his injuries) when the
collapse crater formed.^' Analysis conducted after
the test indicated that the formation of the collapse
crater should have been expected. Shots conducted
on Yucca Flat with the same yield and at the same
depth of burial did, at times, produce surface
collapse craters. In the case of Midas Myth, collapse
was not predicted because there had never been a
collapse crater for a tunnel event and so the analysis
was not made prior to the accident. After analyzing
the test, the conclusion of the Surface Subsidence
Review Committee was:
That the crater is not an indication of some
unusual, anomalous occurrence specific to the U 12X04
emplacement site. Given the normal variation in
explosion phenomena, along with yield, depth of
burial, and geologic setting, experience indicates an
appreciable chance for the foimation of a surface
subsidence crater for Midas Myth.
Prior to the test, the Containment Evaluation
Panel characterized Midas Myth with nine "A"s.
6. Misty Rain ( April 6, 1985, horizontal tunnel
test, less than 20 kilotons, no unintentional release of
radioactive material.)
Misty Rain is unusual in that it is the only tunnel
test since 1970 that did not have three containment
vessels. In the Misty Rain test, the decision was
made that because the tunnel system was so large, a
vessel II was not needed.^^ Despite the lack of a
vessel II, the CEP categorized the containment of
Misty Rain with eight "A"s, and one "B."^^ During
the test, an early flow of energy down the HLOS pipe
prevented the complete closure of the MAC doors.
The MAC doors overlapped, but stopped a couple
inches short of full closure. The TAPS door closed
only 20 percent before the deformation from ground
shock prevented it from closing. A small amount of
30lbid.
3'The injuries were due to the physical circumstances of the collapse. There was no radiation exposure.
'^The drifts in the tunnel system created over 4 million cubic feel of open volume.
''One CEP member did not initially categorize the test, after receiving additional information concerning the test, he categorized the test with an " A. "
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 51
radioactive material escaped down the pipe and then
seeped from the HLOS pipe tunnel into the bypass
tunnel. Subsequently, the tunnel was intentionally
vented so that experimental equipment could be
recovered.
7. Mighty Oak (April 10, 1986, horizontal tunnel
test, less than 20 kilotons, no unintentional release of
radioactive material.)
During the Mighty Oak test, the closure system
near the working point was over-pressured and
failed. The escaped pressure and temperature caused
both the MAC and the GSAC to fail. The loss of the
stemming plug near the working point left the tunnel
an open pathway from the cavity. Temperatures and
pressures on the closed TAPS door reached 2,000 °F
and 1 ,400 pounds per square inch. After 50 seconds,
the center part (approximately 6 feet in diameter) of
the TAPS door broke through. With the closures
removed, the stemming column squeezed out
through the tunnel. Radioactive material leaked
from vessel I, into vessel II, and into vessel III, where
it was successfully contained. Approximately 85
percent of the data from the prime test objectives was
recovered, although about $32 million of normally
recoverable and reusable equipment was lost.^''
Controlled purging of the tunnel began 1 2 days after
the test and continued intermittently from April 22
to May 19, when weather conditions were favorable.
A total of 36,000 Ci were released to the atmosphere
during this period.
IS THERE A REAL ESTATE
PROBLEM AT NTS?
There have been over 600 underground and 100
aboveground nuclear test explosions at the Nevada
Test Site. With testing continuing at a rate of about
a dozen tests a year, the question of whether there
will eventually be no more room to test has been
raised. While such a concern may be justified for the
most convenient areas under the simplest arrange-
ments, it is not justified for the test area in general.
Using the drill-hole spacing of approximately one-
half the depth of burial, high-yield tests can be
spaced about 1,000 feet apart, and low-yield tests
can be spaced at distances of a few hundred feet.
Consequently, a suitable square mile of test site may
provide space for up to 25 high-yield tests or over
300 low-yield tests. Even with testing occurring at a
rate of 1 2 tests a year, the 1 ,350 square miles of test
site provide considerable space suitable for testing.
In recent years, attempts have been made to use
space more economically, so that the most conven-
ient locations will remain available. Tests have
traditionally been spaced in only 2-dimensions. It
may be possible to space tests 3-dimensionally, that
is, with testing located below or above earlier tests.
Additionally, the test spacing has been mostiy for
convenience. If available testing areas become
scarce, it may become possible to test at closer
spacing, or even to test at the same location as a
previous test.
Area for horizontal tunnel tests will also be
available for the future. The N-tunnel area has been
extended and has a sizable area for future testing.
P-tunnel, which is used for low-yield effects tests,
has only been started. (See figure 2-4 in ch. 2 of this
report.) Within Rainier and Aqueduct Mesa alone,
there is enough area to continue tunnel tests at a rate
of two a year for at least the next 30 years.
Consequently, lack of adequate real estate will not
be a problem for nuclear testing for at least several
more decades.
TIRED MOUNTAIN SYNDROME?
The "Tired Mountain Syndrome" hypothesis
postulates that repeated testing in Rainier Mesa has
created a "tired" mountain that no longer has the
strength to contain future tests. Support for this
concern has come from the observation of cracks in
the ground on top of the Mesa and from seismologi-
cal measurements, indicating that large volumes of
rock lose strength during an underground test.
Debate exists, however, over both the inference that
the weakened rock is a danger to containment, and
the premise that large volumes of rock are being
weakened by nuclear testing.
Basic to the concern over tired mountain syn-
drome is the assumption that weakened rock will
adversely affect containment. As discussed previ-
ously, only in an extreme situation, such as detonat-
ing an explosion in water-saturated clay, would rock
strength be a factor in contributing to a leak of
radioactive material. ^^ For example, many tests have
^^Containment and Safety Review for the Mighty Oak Nuclear Weapon Effects Test. U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, N VO-3 1 1 ,
May 1, 1987.
^'See earlier section "Why do nuclear tests remain contained?"
52 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Photo credit: Department of Energy
Fracture on Rainier Mesa.
been detonated in alluvial deposits, which are
essentially big piles of sediment with nearly no
internal strength in an unconfined state. Despite the
weakness and lack of cohesiveness of the material,
such explosions remain well contained.
Compared to vertical drill hole tests, tunnel tests
are overburied and conservatively spaced. The
tunnel system in Rainier Mesa is at a depth of 1 ,300
feet. By the standards for vertical drill hole tests
(using the scaled depth formula^^), this is deep
enough to test at yields of up to 34 kilotons; and yet
all tunnel tests are less than 20 kilotons. ^^ Conse-
quently, all tunnel tests in Rainier Mesa are buried
at depths comparatively greater than vertical drill
hole tests on Yucca Flat. Furthermore, the minimum
separation distance of tunnel shots (twice the com-
bined cavity radii plus 1(X) feet) results in a greater
separation distance than the minimum separation
distance of vertical drill hole shots ('/2 depth of
burial) for tests of the same yield (compare figures
3-2 and 3-3). Consequently, neither material
strength, burial depth, nor separation distance
would make leakage to the surface more likely for
a tunnel test on Rainier Mesa than for a vertical
drill hole tests on Yucca Flat.
Despite the relative lack of importance of strength
in preventing possible leakage to the surface, the
volume of material weakened or fractured by an
explosion is of interest because it could affect the
performance of the tunnel closures and possible
leakage of cavity gas to the tunnel complex. Dispute
over the amount of rock fractured by an underground
nuclear explosion stems from the following two,
seemingly contradictory, but in fact consistent
observations:
1 . Post-shot measurements of rock samples taken
from the tunnel complex generally show no change
in the properties of the rock at a distance greater than
3 cavity radii from the point of the explosion. This
observation implies that rock strength is measurably
decreased only within the small volume of radius =
165 (yield) '\'^^ where the radius is measured in feet
from the point of the explosion and the yield is
measured in kilotons (figure 3-10).
2. Seismic recordings of underground explosions
at Rainier Mesa include signals that indicate the loss
of strength in a volume of rock whose radius is
slightly larger than the scaled depth of burial. This
observation implies that the rock strength is de-
creased throughout the large volume of radius = 500
(yield) ^\ where the radius is measured in feet from
the point of the explosion and the yield is measured
in kilotons (figure 3-1 1). The loss of strength in a
large volume seems to be further supported by
cracks in the ground at the top of Rainier Mesa that
were created by nuclear tests.
The first observation is based on tests of samples
obtained from drilling back into the rock surround-
ing the tunnel complex after a test explosion. The
core samples contain microft^actures out to a distance
from the shot point equal to two cavity radii.
Although microfractures are not seen past two cavity
radii, measurements of seismic shear velocities
36Depth(ft) = 400 (yield(kt))"'
^^''AnnounccdUniiedStatesNuclearlfcsts.July 1945 through December 1987,
United States Department ofEnergy. NVO-209(Rcv,8), April. 1988.
"If the radius of a cavity produced by an explosion is equal to55(yield)"^, a distance of three cavity radii would be equal to three times this, or 165
(yield)'".
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 53
Figure 3-10 — Radius of Decrease in Rock Strength
500 N/7"
Seismic measurements and measurements taken from drill-back samples indicate a seemingly contradictory (but in fact consistent) radius
of decrease in rock strength.
SOURCE: Office of Tecfinology Assessment, 1989.
continue to be low out to a distance of three cavity
radii. The decrease in seismic shear velocity indi-
cates that the rock has been stressed and the strength
decreased. At distances greater than three cavity
radii, seismic velocity measurements and strength
tests typically show no change from their pre-shot
values, although small disturbances along bedding
planes are occasionally seen when the tunnels are
54 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
re-entered after the test. Such measurements suggest
that the explosion only affects rock strength to a
distance from the shot point to about three cavity
radii (165 (yield)'/').
The second observation, obtained from seismic
measurements of tectonic release, suggests a larger
radius for the volume of rock affected by an
explosion. The seismic signals from underground
nuclear explosions frequently contain signals cre-
ated by what is called "tectonic release." By
fracturing the rock, the explosion releases any
preexisting natural stress that was locked within the
rock. The release of the stress is similar to a small
earthquake. The tectonic release observed in the
seismic recordings of underground explosions from
Rainier Mesa indicate the loss of strength in a
volume of rock with a minimum radius equal to 500
(yield)'/'.
Although the drill samples and the seismic data
appear to contradict each other, the following
explanation appears to account for both: The force of
the explosion creates a cavity and fractures rock out
to the distance of 2 cavity radii from the shot point.
Out to 3 cavity radii, existing cracks are extended
and connected, resulting in a decrease in seismic
shear velocity. Outside 3 cavity radii, no new cracks
form. At this distance, existing cracks are opened
and strength is reduced, but only temporarily. The
open cracks close immediately after the shock wave
passes due to the pressure exerted by the overlying
rock. Because the cracks close and no new cracks are
formed, the rock properties are not changed. Post-
shot tests of seismic shear velocity and strength are
the same as pre-shot measurements. This is consis-
tent with both the observations of surface fractures
and the slight disturbances seen along bedding
planes at distances greater than 3 cavity radii. The
surface fractures are due to surface spall, which
would indicate that the rock was overloaded by the
shock wave. The disturbances of the bedding planes
would indicate that fractures are being opened out to
greater distances than 3 cavity radii. In fact, the
bedding plane disturbances are seen out to a distance
of 600 (yield) /\ which is consistent with the radius
determined from tectonic release.
The large radius of weak rock derived from
tectonic release measurements represents the tran-
sient weakening from the shot. The small radius of
weak rock derived from the post-shot tests repre-
sents the volume where the rock properties have
been permanently changed. From the point of view
of the integrity of the tunnel system, it is the smaller
area where the rock properties have been perma-
nently changed (radius = 165 (yield)'/') that should
be considered for containment. Because the line-of-
sight tunnel is located so that the stemming plug
region and closures are outside the region of
permanently weakened or fractured material, the
closure system is not degraded.
HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH?
Every nuclear test is designed to be contained and
is reviewed for containment. In each step of the test
procedure there is built-in redundancy and conserva-
tism. Every attempt is made to keep the chance of
containment failure as remote as possible. This
conservatism and redundancy is essential, however;
because no matter how perfect the process may be,
it operates in an imperfect setting. For each test, the
containment analysis is based on samples, estimates,
and models that can only simplify and (at best)
approximate the real complexities of the Earth. As a
result, predictions about containment depend largely
on judgments developed from past experience. Most
of what is known to cause problems — carbonate
material, water, faults, scarps, clays, etc. — was
learned through experience. To withstand the conse-
quences of a possible surprise, redundancy and
conservatism is a requirement not an extravagance.
Consequently, all efforts undertaken to ensure a safe
testing program are necessary, and they must con-
tinue to be vigorously pursued.
Deciding whether the testing program is safe
requires a judgement of how safe is safe enough. The
subjective nature of this judgement is illustrated
through the decision-making process of the CEP.
which reviews and assesses the containment of each
test.^^ They evaluate whether a test will be contained
using the categorizations of "high confidence,"
' ' adequate degree of confidence, " and " some doubt. "
But, the CEP has no guidelines that attempt to
quantify or describe in probabilistic terms what
constitutes for example, an "adequate degree of
confidence." Obviously one can never have 1(X)
percent confidence that a test will not release
radioactive material. Whether "adequate confi-
"The Containmenl Evaluation Panel is a group of representatives from various laboratories and technical consulting organizations who evaluate the
proposed containment plan for each test without regard to cost or other outside considerations (see ch, 2 for a complete discussion).
Chapter 3 — Containing Underground Nuclear Explosions • 55
dence" translates into a chance of 1 in 100, 1 in
1,000, or 1 in 1,000,000. requires a decision about
what is an acceptable risk level. In turn, decisions of
acceptable risk level can only be made by weighing
the costs of an unintentional release against the
benefits of testing. Consequently, those who feel
that testing is important for our national security will
accept greater risk, and those who oppose nuclear
testing will find even small risks unacceptable.
Establishing an acceptable level of risk is difficult
not only because of value judgments associated with
nuclear testing, but also because the risk is not seen
as voluntary to those outside the testing program.
Much higher risks associated with voluntary, every-
day activities may be acceptable even though the
much lower risks associated with the nuclear test site
may still be considered unacceptable.
The question of whether the testing program is
"safe enough" will ultimately remain a value
judgment that weighs the importance of testing
against the risk to health and environment. In this
sense, concern about safety will continue, largely
fueled by concern about the nuclear testing program
itself However, given the continuance of testing and
the acceptance of the associated environmental
damage, the question of "adequate safety" becomes
replaced with the less subjective question of whether
any improvements can be made to reduce the
chances of an accidental release. In this regard, no
areas for improvement have been identified. This is
not to say that future improvements will not be made
as experience increases, but only that essentially all
suggestions that increase the safety margin have
been implemented. The safeguards built into each
test make the chances of an accidental release of
radioactive material as remote as possible.
Chapter 4
Monitoring Accidental
Radiation Releases
I
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 59
WHAT IS RADIATION? 59
PRODUCTS OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION 59
CRITERIA FOR CONDUCTING A TEST 60
PREDICTING FALLOUT PATTERNS 63
ACCIDENT NOTinCATION 64
Onsite Monitoring by The Department of Energy 65
Offsite Monitoring by The Environmental Protection Agency 66
GROUNDWATER 70
MONITORING CAPABILITY 74
Figures
Figure Page
4-1. The Typical Bimodal Curve for Fission-Product Yield 60
4-2. Controllable and Uncontrollable Areas 62
4-3. Projected Fallout Dispersion Pattern 63
4-4. Yield v. Distance 64
4-5. Typical RAMs Array for Vertical Drill-Hole Shot 66
4-6. Typical RAMs Array for Tbnnel Shot 67
4-7. Air Monitoring Stations 69
4-8. Sample Press Release 72
4-9. Standby Air Surveillance Network Stations 73
4-10. Locations Monitored With Thermoluminescent Dosimeters 74
4-11. Milk Sampling Locations 75
4-12. Standby Milk Surveillance Network 76
4-13. Collection Site for Animals Sampled in 1987 77
4-14. Locations of Families in the Offsite Human Surveillance Program 78
4-15. Well Sampling Locations Onsite 79
4-16. Well Sampling Locations Offsite 80
Tables
Table Page
4-1. Common Radionuclides Involved in a Nuclear Explosion 60
4-2. Summary of Onsite Environmental Monitoring Program 68
4-3. Citizens Alert Water Sampling Program 78
Chapter 4
Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases
Each test is conducted under conditions in which remedial actions could be effective should an
accidental release of radioactive material occur.
INTRODUCTION
Although nuclear tests are designed to minimize
the chance that radioactive material could be re-
leased to the atmosphere, it is assumed as a
precaution for each test that an accident may occur.
To reduce the impact of a possible accident, tests are
conducted only under circumstances whereby reme-
dial actions could be taken if necessary. If it is
estimated that the projected radioactive fallout from
a release would reach an area where remedial actions
are not feasible, the test will be postponed.
Responsibility for radiation safety measures for
the nuclear testing program is divided between the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). The Department
of Energy oversees monitoring within the bounda-
ries of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Environ-
mental Protection Agency monitors the population
around the test site and evaluates the contribution of
nuclear testing to human radiation exposure through
air, water, and food.
WHAT IS RADIATION?
The nuclei of certain elements disintegrate spon-
taneously. They may emit particles, or electromag-
netic waves (gamma rays or x-rays), or both. These
emissions constitute radiation. The isotopes are
called radionuclides. They are said to be radioactive,
and their property of emitting radiation is called
radioactive decay. The rate of decay is characteristic
of each particular radionuclide and provides a
measure of its radioactivity.
The common unit of radioactivity was the curie
(Ci), defined as 3.7 x 10'" decays per second, which
is the radioactivity of one gram of radium. Recently,
a new unit, the becquerel (Bq), has been adopted,
defined as one decay per second. Exposure of
biological tissue to radiation is measured in terms of
rems (standing for roentgen equivalent man). A
roentgen (R) is a unit of exposure equivalent to the
quantity of radiation required to produce one cou-
lomb of electrical charge in one kilogram of dry air.
A rem is the dose in tissue resulting from the
absorption of a rad of radiation multiplied by a
"quality factor" that depends on the type of
radiation. A rad is defined as 100 ergs (a small unit
of energy) per gram of exposed tissue. Recently
accepted international units of radiation are now the
gray (Gy), equal to 100 rads, and the sievert (Sv),
equal to 100 rems.
PRODUCTS OF A NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION
A nuclear explosion creates two sources of
radioactivity: the first source is the direct products of
the nuclear reaction, and the second is the radioactiv-
ity induced in the surrounding material by the
explosion-generated neutrons. In a fission reaction,
the splitting of a nucleus creates two or more new
nuclei that are often intensely radioactive. The
products occur predominantly in two major groups
of elements as shown in figure 4-1. The neutrons
produced by the reaction also react with external
materials such as the device canister, surrounding
rock, etc., making those materials radioactive as
well. In addition to these generated radioactivities,
unbumed nuclear fission fuel (especially plutonium)
is also a radioactive containment. The helium nuclei
formed by fusion reactions are not radioactive.'
However, neutrons produced in the fusion reaction
still will make outside material radioactive. Depend-
ing on the design of the explosive device and its
percentage of fission and fusion, a wide range of
radioactive material can be released with half lives
of less than a second to more than a billion years.-
The debris from nuclear detonations contain a large
number of radioactive isotopes, which emit predom-
inantly gamma and beta radiation. Some of the more
common radionuclides involved in a nuclear explo-
sion are listed in table 4-1.
'This, incidentally, is why commercial fusion reactors (if they could be created) would be a relatively clean source of energy.
^The half-life is the time required for half of the atoms of a radioactive substance to undergo a nuclear transformation to a more stable element.
-59-
60 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-1— The Typical Bimodal Curve for
Fission-Product Yield
2 10''
:
,f
^
/^
.
'
1
1
1
1
1
u
:
1
1
\ ^
-
j
1
1
1
:
1
1
1
\
:
-f
(
«.
1
\
:
1
i
—
—
70 82 94 106 118 130 142 154 166
Mass number
Products of a nuclear explosion occur predominantly in two major
groups of nuclides.
SOURCE; Modified from Lapp and Andrews, Prentice-Hall. Inc., 1972.
Table 4-1 — Common Radionuclides Involved In a
Nuclear Explosion
Radionuclide Half-Life
Uranium-238 4,500,000.000 years
Plutonium-239 24,300 years
Carbon-14 5,800 years
Radium-226 1 ,620 years
Cesium-137 30 years
Strontium-90 28 years
Tritium 12.3 years
Krypton-85 10.9 years
lodine-131 8 days
Xenon-133 5.2 days
lodine-132 2.4 hours
The type of release is also important in predicting
what radionuclides will be present. For example,
atmospheric tests release all radionuclides created.
Prompt, massive ventings have released a nonnegli-
gible fraction of the radionuclides created. Late-
time, minor seeps, like those since 1 970, release only
the most volatile radionuclides. In an underground
explosion, radionuclides also separate (called "frac-
tionation") according to their chemical or physical
characteristics. Refractory particles (particles that
do not vaporize during the nuclear explosion) settle
out fast underground, while more volatile elements
that vaporize easily condense later. TTiis has a strong
effect on radioactive gases that seep slowly through
the soil from an underground explosion. In an
underground explosion, nearly all the reactive mate-
rials are filtered out through the soil column, and the
only elements that come up through the soil to the
atmosphere are the noble gases, primarily krypton
and xenon.
An individual radioactive species follows the
half-life rule of decay — that is, half of the nuclei
disintegrate in a characteristic time, called a "half-
life." However, a mixture of fission products has a
more complicated decay pattern. The general rule of
thumb for a nuclear explosion is that the total
activity decreases by a factor of 10 for every
sevenfold increase in time. In other words, if the
gamma radiation 1 hour after an explosion has an
intensity of 100 units, then 7 hours later it will have
an intensity of 10. Consequently, the time after the
explosion has a dramatic effect on the amount of
radioactivity. A 1 kiloton explosion in the atmos-
phere will produce 41 billion curies 1 minute after
determination, but this will decrease to 10 million
curies in just 12 hours.
CRITERIA FOR CONDUCTING
A TEST
Although every attempt is made to prevent the
accidental release of radioactive material to the
atmosphere, several safety programs are carried out
for each test. These programs are designed to
minimize the likelihood and extent of radiation
exposure offsite and to reduce risks to people should
an accidental release of radioactive material occur.
The Environmental Protection Agency monitors the
population around the test site and has established
plans to protect people should an accident occur.
EPA's preparations are aimed toward reducing the
whole-body exposure of the off-site populace and to
minimizing thyroid dose to offsite residents, particu-
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 61
larly from the ingestion of contaminated milk.^ The
whole-body dose is the main concern. However,
deposition of radioactive material on pastures can
lead to concentration in milk obtained from cows
that graze on those pastures. The infant thyroid doses
from drinking milk from family cows is also
assessed.**
The Department of Energy's criteria for conduct-
ing a test are:
For tests at the Nevada Test Site, when consider-
ing the event-day weather conditions and the specific
event characteristics, calculations should be made
using the most appropriate hypothetical release
models which estimate the off-site exposures that
could result from the most probable release scenario.
Should such estimates indicate that off-site popula-
tions, in areas where remedial actions to reduce
whole-body exposures are not feasible, could receive
average whole-body dose in excess of 0. 1 7 R/year
(170 mR/year), the event shall be postponed until
more favorable conditions prevail. In addition,
events may proceed only where remedial actions
against uptake of radionuclides in the food chain are
practicable and/or indications are that average thy-
roid doses to the population will not exceed 0.5
R/year (500 mR/year).^
These criteria mean that a test can only take place
if the estimate of the fallout from an accidental
release of radioactivity would not be greater than
0.17 Ryyear in areas that are uncontrollable, i.e.,
where "remedial actions to reduce whole-body
exposures are not feasible." Thus, tests are not
conducted when the wind is blowing in the general
'direction of populated areas considered to be uncon-
trollable, except under persistent light wind condi-
jtions that would limit the significant fallout to the
immediate vicinity of the NTS. Areas considered to
be uncontrollable by EPA are shown in figure 4-2.
The EPA and DOE have also defined a controlla-
ble area (figure 4-2), within which remedial actions
are considered feasible. Criteria for the controllable
area, as defined by the DOE are:
. . . those areas where trained rad-safe monitors are
available, where communications are effective (where
the exposure of each individual can be documented),
where people can be expected to comply with
recommended remedial actions, and where remedial
actions against uptake of radionuclides in the food
chain are practicable.
The controllable area is the zone within approxi-
mately 125 miles of the test control point (see figure
4-2) for which EPA judges that its remedial actions
would be effective. Within this area, EPA has the
capability to track any release and perform remedial
actions to reduce exposure, including sheltering or
evacuation of all personnel (as needed); controlling
access to the area; controlling livestock feeding
practices, i.e., providing feed rather than allowing
grazing; replacing milk; and controlling food and
water.
In the case of the controllable area, a test may be
conducted if the fallout estimate implies that indi-
viduals in the area would not receive whole-body
doses in excess of 0.5 R/year and thyroid doses of 1 .5
R/year. If winds measured by the weather service
indicate that the cloud of radioactive debris pro-
duced by the assumed venting would drift over
controllable areas, such as to the north, the test is
permitted when EPA's mobile monitors are in the
downwind areas at populated places. EPA must be
ready to measure exposure and to assist in moving
people under cover or evacuating them, if necessary,
to keep their exposures below allowable levels.
As a consequence of the geometry of the control-
lable area, tests are generally not conducted if winds
aloft blow toward Las Vegas or towards other nearby
populated locations. In addition, the test will not be
conducted if there is less than 3 hours of daylight
remaining to track the cloud.
Prior to conducting a test, detailed fallout projec-
tions are made by the weather service for the
condition of "the unlikely event of a prompt
massive venting." Predictions are made of the
projected fallout pattern and the maximum radiation
exposures that might occur. An example of such a
prediction is shown in figure 4-3. The center line is
the predicted path of maximum fallout deposition
for a prompt venting, marked with estimated arrival
times (in hours) at various distances. Lines to either
side indicate the width of the fallout area. The two
dashed lines indicate the 500 mR/year area and the
^See "Offsile Remedial Action Capability for Underground Nuclear Weapons Tfest Accidents," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Environmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory — Las Vegas, NV, October 1988.
' ''In the case of an accident, however, the actual dose would be minimized because the milk would be replaced as much as possible.
'See "Offsite Remedial Action Capability for Underground Nuclear Weapons Tfest Accidents,"' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
invu-onmental Monitoring Systems Laboratory — Las Vegas, NV, October 1988.
62 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-2 — Controllable and Uncontrollable Areas
Uncontrollable
g 5 10 20 30 40 50
Scale in miles
The controllable area is the region within which remedial actions are considered feasible.
SOURCE; Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
170 mR/year level. If 0.17 mR/year (the maximum
external exposure allowed during a 12-month period
for an uncontrolled population) or more is predicted
to fall outside the controllable area, the test will be
postponed. Within the predictions shown in figure;
4-3. the test could be conducted if EPA monitors
were prepared to be at each of the ranches, mines,
and other populated areas within the dispersion
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 63
Figure 4-3 — Projected Fallout Dispersion Pattern
Tonopah
50
1 I I .1 L_l
Scale in miles
;ey: H+ number= time of detonation plus elapsed liours; mR- milllREM
Predicted fallout pattern for the case of an accidental venting.
SOURCE: Modified from: "Public Safety for Nuclear Weapons Tests," U.S.
I Environmental Protection Agency, January 1984.
pattern to measure exposure and perform remedial
[actions should they be necessary.
I The preferred weather conditions for a test are a
1 clear sky for tracking, southerly winds (winds from
Ithe south), no thunderstorms or precipitation that
1 would inhibit evacuation, and stable weather pat-
items. During the test preparations, the Weather
i Service Nuclear Support Office provides the Test
Controller with predicted weather conditions. This
information is used by the Weather Service to derive
]the estimated fallout pattern should an accidental
release occur. About one-third of all nuclear tests are
delayed for weather considerations; the maximum
jdelay in recent years reached 16 days.
PREDICTING FALLOUT
PATTERNS
The predicted fallout pattern from an underground
test depends on many variables related to the type of
nuclear device, the device's material composition,
type of venting, weather conditions, etc. With so
many variables and so little experience with actual
ventings, fallout predictions can only be considered
approximations. The accuracy of this approxima-
tion, however, is critical to the decision of whether
a test can be safely conducted. Fallout predictions
are made by the Weather Service Nuclear Support
Office using up-to-date detailed weather forecasts
combined with a model for a "prompt massive
venting." The model uses scaling technique based
on the actual venting of an underground test that
occurred on March 13, 1964. The test, named
"Pike," was a low-yield (less than 20 kilotons)
explosion detonated in a vertical shaft. A massive
venting occurred 10 to 15 seconds after detonation.^
The venting continued for 69 seconds, at which time
the overburden rock collapsed forming a surface
subsidence crater and blocking further venting. The
vented radioactive debris, consisting of gaseous and
particulate material, rose rapidly to about 3.000 feet
above the surface.
The Pike scaling model has been used to calculate
estimates of fallout patterns for the past 20 years
because: 1) the large amount of data collected from
the Pike venting allowed the development of a
scaling model, and 2) Pike is considered to be the
worst venting in terms of potential exposure to the
public.^
The Pike model, however, is based on a very small
release of radioactive material compared to what
would be expected from an aboveground test of the
same size.** The percentage of radioactive material
released from the Baneberry venting (7 percent from
table 3-1), for example, is many times greater than
the percentage of material released from the Pike
test.^ It would therefore appear that Baneberry
provides a more conservative model than Pike. This,
however, is not the case because Baneberry was not
"^Pikc was conducted in alluvium in Area 3 of the test site. The release was attributed lo a fracture that propagated to the surface. Other factors
:ontnbuling to the release were an inadequate depth of burial and an inadequate closure of the line-of-sighl pipe.
'"1985 Analyses and Evaluations of the Radiological and Meteorological Data from ihc Pike Event." National Oceanic and Atmospheric
lAdministralion, Weather Service Nuclear Support Office, Las Vegas, NV, December, 1986, NVO-308.
'The exact amount of material released from the 1964 Pike test remains classified.
'See table 3-1 for a comparison of various releases.
64 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
a prompt venting. Baneberry vented through a
fissure and decaying radioactive material was
pumped out over many hours. Baneberry released
more curies than Pike; however, due to its slower
release, a higher percentage of the Baneberry
material was in the form of noble gases, which are
not deposited. The data suggest that much less than
7 percent of the released material was deposited. '°
Therefore, it is thought that Pike is actually a more
conservative model than Baneberry.
The sensitivity of the Pike model can be judged by
looking at the degree to which its predictions are
affected by the amount of material released. For
example, consider a test in which 10 percent of the
radioactive material produced by the explosion is
accidentally released into the atmosphere; in other
words, 10 percent of the material that would have
been released if the explosion had been detonated
aboveground. This also roughly corresponds to the
amount of material that would be released if the
explosion had been detonated underground at the
bottom of an open (unstemmed) hole. The 10 percent
release can therefore be used as a rough approxima-
tion for the worst case release from an underground
test. To evaluate the adequacy of the Pike model
predictions to withstand the full range of uncertainty
of an accidental release, the question is: what effect
would a release of 10 percent rather than, say 1
percent, have on the location of 170-mR and
500-mR exposure lines? As figure 4-4 illustrates,
changing the yield of an explosion by an order of
magnitude (in other words, increasing the release
from say 1 percent to 10 percent) increases the
distance of the 170-mR and 500-mR lines by
roughly a factor of 2. Therefore, assuming a worst
case scenario of a 10 percent prompt massive
venting (as opposed to the more probable scenario of
around a 1 percent prompt massive venting), the
distance of the exposure levels along the predicted
fallout lines would only increase by a multiple of 2.
The Pike model therefore provides a prediction that
is at least within a factor of about 2 of almost any
possible worst-case scenario.
ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION
Any release of radioactive material is publicly
announced if the release occurs during, or immedi-
ately following, a test. If a late-time seep occurs, the
release will be announced if it is predicted that the
Figure 4-4 — Yield v. Distance
1.000 cr
Total 1st year Total 1st year
exposure exposure
500 mR 170 mR
Distance (miles)
Constant Pil(e Parameters
Wind speed = 15mph
Vertical wind shear = 20°
Cloud rise = 5,000ft
Variable
Yield* Pike
Yield (in kilotons) v. distance (in miles) for projected fallout using
the Pike Model. TYE indicates total first year exposure. Increasing
tfie yield by a factor of 1 rougfily doubles tfie downwind distance
of the projected fallout pattern.
SOURCE: Provided by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Wsather Service Nuclear Support Office, 1988.
radioactive material will be detected outside the
boundaries of the test site. If no detection off-site is
predicted, the release may not be announced.
Operational releases that are considered routine
(such as small releases from drill-back operations)
are similarly announced only if it is estimated that
they will be detected off-site.
The Environmental Protection Agency is present
at every test and is therefore immediately aware of
any prompt release. The Environmental Protection
Agency, however, is not present at post-test drill-
back operations. In the case of late-time releases or
operational releases, the Environmental Protection
Agency depends on notification from the Depart-
ment of Energy and on detection of the release (once
'"Baneberry, however, had a limited data set of usable radioactive readings.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 65
' it has reached outside the borders of the test site) by
the EPA offsite monitoring system.
Estimates of whether a particular release will be
detected offsite are made by the Department of
Energy or the sponsoring laboratory. Such judg-
ments, however, are not always correct. During the
drill-back operations of the Glencoe test in 1986,
minor levels of radioactive material were detected
offsite contrary to expectations. During the Riola
test in 1980, minor amounts of radioactive inert
gases were detected offsite. In both cases. DOE
personnel did not anticipate the release to be
detected offsite and therefore did not notify EPA."
Although the releases were extremely minor and
well-monitored within the test site by DOE, EPA
was not aware of the release until the material had
crossed the test site boundaries. Both cases fueled
concern over DOE's willingness to announce acci-
dents at the test site. The failure of DOE to publicly
announce all releases, regardless of size or cir-
cumstance, contributes to public concerns over
the secrecy of the testing program and reinforces
the perceptions that all the dangers of the testing
program are not being openly disclosed.
Onsite Monitoring by the
Department of Energy
The Department of Energy has responsibility for
monitoring within the boundaries of the Nevada Test
Site to evaluate the containment of radioactivity
onsite and to assess doses-to-man from radioactive
releases as a result of DOE operations. To achieve
these objectives, DOE uses a comprehensive moni-
toring system that includes both real-time monitor-
ing equipment and sample recovery equipment. The
real-time monitoring system is used for prompt
detection following a test, the sample recovery
equipment is used to assess long-term dose and risk.
The heart of the real-time monitoring system is a
network of Remote Area Monitors (RAMs). For all
tests, RAMs are arranged in an array around the test
hole (figure 4-5). Radiation detectors are also
frequently installed down the stemming column so
the flow of radioactive material up the emplacement
hole can be monitored. In tunnel shots, there are
RAMs above the shot point, throughout the tunnel
complex, outside the tunnel entrance, and in each
containment vessel (figure 4-6). In addition to
RAMs positioned for each shot, a permanent RAM
network with stations throughout the test site is in
continual operation.
During each test, a helicopter with closed-circuit
television circles the ground zero location. Nearby.
a second helicopter and an airplane are prepared to
track any release that might occur. A third helicopter
and an airplane remain on stand-by should they be
needed. In addition, a team (called the "Bluebird
Team"), consisting of trained personnel in 2 four-
wheel drive vehicles outfitted with detection equip-
ment and personnel protection gear is stationed near
the projected fallout area to track and monitor any
release. Approximately 50 radiation monitoring
personnel are available on the Nevada Test Site to
make measurements of exposure rates and collect
samples for laboratory analysis should they be
needed. Prior to the test, portions of the test site are
evacuated unless the operation requires manned
stations. If manned stations are required, direct
communication links are established with the work-
ers and evacuation routes are set-up.
In addition to the real-time monitoring network,
air and water samples are collected throughout the
Test Site and analyzed at regular intervals. This
comprehensive environmental monitoring program
is summarized in table 4-2. The network of samplers
located throughout the Test Site includes 160
thermoluminescent dosimeters; over 40 air samplers
that collect samples for analysis of radioiodines.
gross beta, and plutonium-239; and about half a
dozen noble gas samplers. Each year over 4,500
samples are collected and analyzed for radiological
measurement and characterization of the Nevada
Test Site. All sample collection, preparation, analy-
sis, and review are performed by the staff of the
Laboratory Operations Section of REECO's Envi-
ronmental Sciences Department.
In the case of a prompt, massive accidental release
of radioactive material, the following emergency
procedures would be initiated:
1. any remaining test site employees downwind
of the release would be evacuated,
2. monitoring teams and radiological experts
would be dispatched to offsite downwind
areas.
"In the case of Riola, the release occurred in the evening and was not reported until the following morning. As a result, it was 1 2'/^ hours before EPA
was notified.
66 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-5 — Typical RAMs Array for Vertical
Drill-Hole Shot
Post shot access Rd.
Plug truck access rd.
In addition to the RAMs located down the drill hole, nine RAMs are
placed at the surface around the test hole.
SOURCE: Modified from Department of Energy
3. ground and airborne monitoring teams would
measure radioactive fallout and track the
radioactive cloud,
4. Federal, State, and local authorities would be
notified, and
5. if necessary, persons off-site would be re-
quested to remain indoors or to evacuate the
area for a short time.'-
Offsite Monitoring by the Environmental
Protection Agency
Under an interagency agreement with the Depart-
ment of Energy, the Environmental Protection
Agency is responsible for evaluating human radia-
tion exposure from ingesting air, water, and food that
may have been affected by nuclear testing. To
accomplish this, EPA collects over 8,700 samples
each year and performs over 15,000 analytical
measurements on water, milk, air, soil, humans,
plants, and animals.'^ The sampling system and
results are published annually in EPA's "Offsite
Environmental Monitoring Report, Radiation Moni-
toring Around United States Nuclear Test Areas."
The heart of the EPA monitoring system is the
network of 18 community monitoring stations. The
community monitoring program began in 1981 and
was modeled after a similar program instituted in the
area surrounding the Three Mile Island nuclear
reactor power plant in Pennsylvania. Community
participation allows residents to verify independ-
ently the information being released by the govern-
ment and thereby provide reassurance to the commu-
nity at large. The program is run in parmership with
several institutions. The Department of Energy
funds the program and provides the equipment. The
Environmental Protection Agency maintains the
equipment, analyzes collected samples, and inter-
prets results. The Desert Research Institute manages
the network, employs local station managers, and
independently provides quality assurance and data
interpretation. The University of Utah trains the
station managers selected by the various communi-
ties. Whenever possible, residents with some scien-
tific training (such as science teachers) are chosen as
station managers.
There are 18 community monitoring stations
(shown as squares in figure 4-7) located around the
test site. The equipment available to each station
includes;'''
Noble Gas Samplers: These samplers compress
air in a tank. The air sample is then analyzed to
measure the concentration of such radioactive noble
gases as xenon and krypton.
Tritium Sampler: These samplers remove mois-
ture from the air. The moisture is then analyzed to
measure the concentration of tritium in the air.
Particulates and Reactive Gases Sampler: These
samplers draw 2 cubic feet of air per minute through
a paper filter and then through a canister of activated
charcoal. The paper filter collects particles and the
charcoal collects reactive gases. Both are analyzed
for radioactivity.
'^Modified from "Onsite Environmental Report for the Nevada Tfest Site" (January 1987 through December 1987), Daniel A. Gon/.alcz, REECo.,
inc., DOE/NV/10327-39.
'^In addition, EPA annually visits each location outside the Nevada Test Site where a nuclear test has occurred.
'^"Community Radiation Monitoring Program," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, January 1984.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 67
Figure 4-6— lypical RAMs Array for TUnnel Shot ("Mission Cyber," Dec. 2, 1988)
Surface Locations
# RAM Locations
_| = 200
A total of 41 RAI*^s (15 above tfie surface, 26 belowground) are used to monitor the containment of radioactive material from a horizontal
tunnel test
SOURCE: Modified from Department of Energy
Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD): When
heated (thermo-), the TLD releases absorbed energy
in the form of light (-luminescent). The intensity of
the light is proportional to the gamma radiation
absorbed, allowing calculation of the total gamma
radiation exposure.
Gamma Radiation Exposure Rate Recorder: A
pressurized ion chamber detector for gamma radia-
tion is connected to a recorder so that a continuous
record of gamma radiation is obtained and changes
in the normal gamma radiation level are easily seen.
Microbarograph: This instrument measures and
records barometric pressure. The data are useful in
interpreting gamma radiation exposure rate records.
At lower atmospheric pressure, naturally occurring
radioactive gases (like radon) are released in greater
amounts from the Earth's surface and their radioac-
tive decay contributes to total radiation exposure.
68 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Table 4-2 — Summary of Onsite Environmental Monitoring Program
Collection Number
Sample type Description frequency of locations Analysis
Air Continuous sampling through Weekly 44 Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta, Pu-239
gas filter & charcoal cartridge
Low-volume sampling through Biweekly 16 Tritium (HTO)
silica gel
Continuous low volume Weekly 7 Noble gases
Potable water 1 -liter grab sample Weekly 7 Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarterly)
Supply wells 1 -liter grab sample Monthly 1 6 Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarterly)
Open reservoirs 1 -liter grab sample Monthly 1 7* Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarterly)
Natural springs 1 -liter grab sample Monthly 9* Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarteriy)
Ponds (contaminated) 1 -liter grab sample Monthly 8" Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarteriy)
Ponds (effluent) 1 -liter grab sample Monthly 5 Gamma Spectroscopy gross beta.tritium Pu-
239 (quarteriy)
External gamma radiation
levels Thermoluminescent Semi- 153 Total integrated exposure over field cycle
Dosimeters annually
'Not all of tfiese locations were sampled due to inaccessibility or lack of water.
Photo credit: David Graham. 19
Community Monitoring Station. Las Vegas, NV.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 69
Figure 4-7— Air Monitoring Stations
Nevada
(D
Austin
Ely
®
Sunnyside
Stone Cabin Rn. Blue Eagle Rn.
Vj/ • Nyala
®
Goldfield • ^^'" Springs Rn.
• hr ^_^
(Rachel
Scotty's Jet.
Beatty
®
Nevada
Test
Site
Groom
Lake
(i)
I Pioche
I
HIko (■)Caliente
Indian
Springs
Lathrop Wells (W — ^/^
A Pahrump /^\ x-^
Furnace Creek 9 \L"y (H)
Death Valley Jct.#^
Shoshone
(i)
Salt Lake City
Delta
I Milford
(i)
Cedar City
(||)st. George
Arizona
(D
Community monitoring stations
Community monitoring stations with noble
gas and tritium samplers
Additional air surveillance network stations
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
70 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
The monitoring stations are extremely sensi-
tive; they can detect changes in radiation exposure
due to changing weather conditions. For example,
during periods of low atmospheric pressure, gamma
exposure rates are elevated on the order of 2 to 4
uR/hr because of the natural radioactive products
being drawn out of the ground. To inform the public,
data from the community monitoring stations are
posted at each station and sent to local newspapers
(figure 4-8).
In addition to the 18 community monitoring
stations, 13 other locations are used for the Air
Surveillance Network (shown as circles in figure
4-7) to monitor particulates and reactive gases. The
air surveillance network is designed to cover the area
within 350 kilometers of the Nevada Test Site, with
a concentration of stations in the prevailing down-
wind direction. The air samplers draw air through
glass fiber filters to collect airborne particles (dust).
Charcoal filters are placed behind the glass fiber
filters to collect reactive gases. These air samplers
are operated continuously and samples are collected
three times a week. The Air Surveillance Network is
supplemented by 86 standby air sampling stations
located in every State west of the Mississippi River
(figure 4-9). These stations are ready for use as
needed and are operated by local individuals or
agencies. Standby stations are used 1 to 2 weeks
each quarter to maintain operational capability and
detect long-term trends.
Noble gas and tritium samplers are present at 1 7
of the air monitoring stations (marked with asterisk
in figure 4-7). The samplers are located at stations
close to the test site and in areas of relatively low
altitude where wind drains from the test site. Noble
gases, like krypton and xenon, are nonreactive and
are sampled by compressing air in pressure tanks.
Tritium, which is the radioactive form of hydrogen,
is reactive but occurs in the form of water vapor in
air. It is sampled by trapping atmospheric moisture.
The noble gas and tritium samplers are in continuous
operation and samples are recovered and analyzed
weekly.
To monitor total radiation doses, a network of
approximately 130 TLDs is operated by EPA. The
network encircles the test site out to a distance of
about 400 miles with somewhat of a concentration in
the zones of predicted fallout (figure 4-10). The TLD
network is designed to measure environmental
radiation exposures at a location rather than expo-
sures to a specific individual. By measuring expo-
sures at fixed locations, it is possible to determine
the maximum exposure an individual would have
received had he or she been continually present at
that location. In addition, about 50 people living near
the test site and all personnel who work on the test
site wear TLD's. All TLD's are checked every 3
months for absorbed radiation.
Radioactive material is deposited from the air
onto pastures. Grazing cows concentrate certain
radionuclides, such as iodine-131 , strontium-90, and
cesium- 137 in their milk. The milk therefore be-
comes a convenient and sensitive indicator of the
fallout. The Environmental Protection Agency ana-
lyzes samples of raw milk each month from about 25
farms (both family farms and commercial dairies)
surrounding the test site (figure 4-1 1). In addition to
monthly samples, a standby milk surveillance net-
work of 120 Grade A milk producers in all States
west of the Mississippi River can provide samples in
case of an accident (figure 4-12). Samples from the
standby network are collected annually.
Another potential exposure route of humans to
radionuclides is through meat of local animals.
Samples of muscle, lung, liver, kidney, blood, and
bone are collected periodically from cattle pur-
chased from commercial herds that graze northeast
of the test site. In addition, samples of sheep, deer,
horses, and other animals killed by hunters or
accidents are used (figure 4-13). Soft tissues are
analyzed for gamma-emitters. Bone and liver are
analyzed for strontium and plutonium; and blood/
urine or soft tissue is analyzed for tritium.
A human surveillance program is also carried out
to measure the levels of radioactive nuclides in
families residing in communities and ranches around
the test site (figure 4-14). About 40 families living
near the test site are analyzed twice a year. A
whole-body count of each person is made to assess
the presence of gamma-emitting radionuclides.
GROUNDWATER
About 100 underground nuclear tests have been
conducted directly in the groundwater. In addition,
many pathways exist for radioactive material from
other underground tests (tests either above or below
the water table) to migrate from the test cavities to
the groundwater. To detect the migration of radioac-
tivity from nuclear testing to potable water sources,
a long-term hydrological monitoring program is
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 71
Photo credit: David Graham,
Whole Body Counter, Environmental Protection Agency.
managed by the Environmental Protection Agency
at the Department of Energy's direction with advice
on sampling locations being obtained from the U.S.
Geological Survey. Whenever possible, water sam-
ples are collected from wells downstream (in the
direction of movement of underground water) from
sites of nuclear detonations. On the Nevada Test
Site, about 22 wells are sampled monthly (figure
4-15). The 29 wells around the Nevada Test Site
(figure 4-16) are also sampled monthly and analyzed
for tritium semiannually.
The flow of groundwater through the Nevada Test
Site is in a south-southwesterly direction. The flow
speed is estimated to be about 10 feet per year,
although in some areas it may move as fast as 600
feet per year. To study the migration of radionu-
clides from underground tests. DOE drilled a test
well near a nuclear weapons test named "Cambric.""
Cambric had a yield of 0.75 kilotons and was
detonated in a vertical drill hole in 1965. A test well
was drilled to a depth of 200 feet below the cavity
created by Cambric. It was found that most of the
radioactivity produced by the test was retained
within the fused rock formed by the explosion,
although low concentrations of radioactive material
were found in the water at the bottom of the cavity.'^
A satellite well was also drilled 300 feet from the
cavity. More than 3 billion gallons of water were
pumped from the satellite well in an effort to draw
water from the region of the nuclear explosion. The
only radioactive materials found in the water were
extremely small quantities (below the permitted
"See "Radionuclide Migralion in Groundwater al NTS," U.S. Depanmcni of Energy, September, 1987.
72 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Alamo, IW
Figure 4-8 — Sample Press Release
July 11 to July 20, 1988
The Nevada Test Site
COMMUNITY RADIATION MONITORING REPORT
ft J V>EPA
Dell Sullivan, Manager of the Community Radiation Monitoring Station in
Alamo, NV reported the results of the radiation measurements at this station
for the period July 11 to July 20, 1988. The average gamma radiation exposure
rate recorded by a Pressurized Ion Chamber at this station was 13.0
microroentgens* per hour as shown on the chart.
AVERAGE GAMMA RADIATION EXPOSURE RATE
RECORDED ON THE PRESSURIZED ION CHAMBER AT
ALAMO, NV, DURING THE WEEK ENDING JULY 20, 1988
This Week
-A
Last Week
Last Year
U.S.Background''
h
10 20
Microroentgens Per Hour
The averages of the 16 Community Monitoring Stations operated for the
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy and the Desert
Research Institute varied from 6.2 microroentgens per hour at Las Vegas, NV
to 20.2 microroentgens per hour at Austin, N\'. All of the rates for the past week
were within the normal background range for the United States as shown on the
accompanying chart. Environmental radiation exposure rates vary with
altitude and natural radioactivity in the soil. Additional information and
detailed data obtained from Community Radiation Monitoring Network
Stations, including an annual summary of the results from all monitoring
around the Nevada Test Site, can be obtained from Mr. Sullivan (702) 725-3544
or by calling Charles F. Costa at the EPA in Las Vegas (702) 798-2305.
The roentgen is a measure of exposure to X or gamma radiation. A microroenteen is 1
millionth or a roentgen. For comparison, one chest x-ray results in an exposure of 10,000 to
20,000 microroentgens.
Sum of cosmic plus terrestrial dose rales in air in the U.S.(pp37,42, BEIR III, 1980).
Example of community radiation monitoring report that is posted at each monitoring station and sent to the press.
SOURCE; Environmental Protection Agency.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 73
Figure 4-9 — Standby Air Surveiiiance Network Stations
Canada
11*
^^^^'ngton I \ Montana
^^ Scale in Miles
^ 100 300 500
I I ' l I' M I ' l ' i
100 300 500 700
Scale in Kilometers
86 standby air surveillance stations are available and samples are collected and analyzed every 3 months to maintain a data base.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
level for drinking water) of krypton-85, chlorine-36,
ruthenium- 106, technetium-99 and iodine- 129.
Radioactive material from nuclear testing moves
through the groundwater at various rates and is
filtered by rock and sediment particles. Tritium,
however, is an isotope of hydrogen and becomes
incorporated in water molecules. As a result, tritium
moves at the same rate as groundwater. Tritium is
therefore the most mobile of the radioactive materi-
als. Although tritium migrates, the short half-life of
tritium (12.3 years) and slow movement of the
groundwater prevents it from reaching the Test Site
boundary. No analysis of groundwater has ever
found tritium at a distance greater than a few
hundred meters from some of the old test sites. None
of the water samples collected outside the bounda-
74 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-10 — Locations Monitored With Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs)
Winnemucca
Wells
Eldo
Pyramid Lake
<\
Reno
Austin
Carson^
City
Mono '
Lake
Ely.
Tonopati^
Bistiop
I Nellis^-- *•
Range
rs
Alamo
Salt
Lake
Salt
Lake
City
.Lathrop .
Wells Las
' Vegas
Lake Mead
Bakerstield
Barstow
50
Scale in Miles
One hundred thirty locations are monitored with TLDs. All TLDs are checked every 3 months for absorbed radiation.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
ries of the test site has ever had detectable levels of
radioactivity attributable to the nuclear testing
program. An independent test of water samples from
around the test site was conducted by Citizen Alert
(Reno, Nevada) at 14 locations (table 4-3).
Citizen Alert found no detectable levels of tritium
or fission products in any of their samples. With-
standing any major change in the water table, there
currently appears to be no problem associated with
groundwater contamination offsite of the Nevada
Test Site.
MONITORING CAPABILITY
The combination of: 1) the monitoring system
deployed for each test, 2) the onsite monitoring
system run by DOE, and 3) the offsite monitoring
system run by EPA, forms a comprehensive detec-
tion system for radioactive material. There is
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 75
Figure 4-11 — Milk Sampling Lx>catlons
• Young Rn.
Larsen Rn. •
Burdick Rn
Harbecke Rn.
Round Mtn
Berg Rn
Twin Spgs Rn
■ r, Lund
Manzonie Rn • McKenzie Dairy
Currant •
• Blue Eagle Rn.
Nyala
Sharp's Rn.
Penoyer
1 Farms • „
i-| Darrel Hansen
I . Rn.
June Cox
Rn.
Brent Jones
Dairy
Scale in Miles
50
1 1
100
1 1 1
50 100
150
Scale in Kilometers
• Milk sampling locations
Cedarsage Farm
• Bill Nelson Dairy
Hinkley
Samples of raw milk are collected each month from about 25 farms surrounding the test site.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
76 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-12— Standby Milk Surveiliance Network
All major mllksheds west of the Mississippi River are part of thie standby milk surveillance network.
Samples are collected and analyzed annually.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
essentially no possibility that a significant release
of radioactive material from an underground
nuclear test could go undetected. Similarly, there
is essentially no chance that radioactive material
could reach a pathway to humans and not be
discovered by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Allegations that a release of radioactive material
could escape from the test site undetected are based
on partial studies that only looked at a small portion
of the total monitoring system.'* Such criticisms are
invalid when assessed in terms of the total monitor-
ing system.
The radiation monitoring system continues to
improve as new measurement systems and tech-
niques become available and as health risks from
radiation become better understood. Assuming that
the monitoring effort will continue to evolve, and
that such issues as the migration of radioactive
material in groundwater will continue to be aggres-
sively addressed, there appear to be no valid criti-
cisms associated with the containment of under-
ground nuclear explosions. This is not to say that
future improvement will not be made as experience
increases, but only that essentially all relevant
suggestions made to date that increase the safety
margin have been implemented.
Public confidence in the monitoring system suf-
fers from a general lack of confidence in the
Department of Energy that emanates from the
enivronmental problems at nuclear weapons produc-
tion facilities and from the radiation hazards associ-
ated with past atmospheric tests. In the case of the
'''Sec for example, "A review of off-site cnvironmenial monitoring of ihc Nevada Test Site.' ' Bcmd Franke. Health Effects of Underground Nuclear
Tests, Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hou.se of
Representatives, Sept. 25. 1987, Serial No. 100-35, pp. 120-144.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 77
Figure 4-13— Collection Site for Animals Sampled in 1987
o
o
Q.C. Smt.
O
O
o
Bighorn Sheep
D
Mule Deer
▲
Cattle
♦
Chukar
■
Horse
o
vO
Depending on availability, an assortment of animals are analyzed each year.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency.
7S • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Table 4-3 — Citizen Alert Water Sampling Program
Location
Type of Sample
Springdale Ranch
Barley Hot Springs
3 mi. south of Flourspar Canyon
Lathrop Wells
Point of Rock Spring. Ash Meadows
Devils Hole, Ash Meadows
Shoshone, CA
Amargosa Junction
Goldfield
Moore's Station
Six Mile Creek
Tytio and Route 6 {DOE facility)
Hot Creek and Route 6
Blue Jay
Well (hose)
Stream
Amargosa River
Spigot at gas station
Pond
Pool
Stream
Well (hose)
Well (spigot at gas station)
Pond
Stream
Well (tap)
Stream
Well (hose)
SOURCE: Citizen Alert, 1988
underground nuclear testing program, this mistrust
is exacerbated by tiie reluctance on the part of the
Department of Energy to disclose information con-
cerning the nuclear testing program, and by the
knowledge that not all tests that release radioactive
material to the atmosphere (whatever the amount or
circumstances) are announced. This has led to
allegations by critics of the testing program that:
... the Energy Department is continuing its misin-
formation campaign by refusing to disclose the size
of most underground tests, by hushing up or
downplaying problems that occur and by not an-
nouncing most tests in advance, thereby leaving
people downwind unprepared in the event of an
accidental release of radioactive materials.'^
Such concern could be greatly mitigated if a
policy were adopted such that all tests were an-
nounced, or at least that all tests that released any
radioactive material to the atmosphere (whatever the
amount or circumstances) were announced.
Figure 4-14 — Locations of Families in the Offsite Human Surveillance Program
ft
Pyramid Lake
Nevada
• Austin
Ely
%
. Lund
Salt
Lake
Salt Lake City
Round Mt ooo Currant
o
Blue Jay o o Blue Eagle Ranch
Tonopah ^^ ° Nyala Eagle Valley
Goldfield
Nevada
Test
Site
Beatty
^ .
Lattirop Wells o
Pahrump
Shoshone*
o Offsite Family
• Community Monitoring Sta. Family
Cedar City
Bunkerville
Indian overton
About 40 families from around the test site are brought in to EPA twice a year for whole-body analysis.
SOURCE: Modified from Environmental Protection Agency
'^John Hanrahan. "Testing Underground," Common Cause. voL 15, No. I, January/February 1989.
Chapter 4 — Monitoring Accidental Radiation Releases • 79
Figure 4-15 — Well Sampling Locations Onsite
Scale In Miles
22 wells on the Nevada Test Site are sampled monthly.
SOURCE: Modified from Department of Energy.
80 • The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions
Figure 4-16 — W^ll Sampling Locations Offslte
Twin Springs Rn. •
• Nyala
• Adaven Springs
Tonopah
\ Goss Springs c _
\ •l1S/48-1dd
N Beatty • •^ ,Younghans Ranch(2)
\US Ecology. Specie Springs
u
\
• Tennpiute
• Penoy8r(3)
Crystal Springs
VJusaf #2|
Lathrop Wells •
^ ^ » Fairbanks Springs
Well 17S/50E-14CaC • . , , „ ,
\ • Crystal Pool
Well 1 88/51 E-7db •
u
Indian Springs
Sewer Co. Well 1
Scale in l\^iles
10 20 30
40
s^A, • Calvada Well 1
• Shostione "^^
Spring
Las Vegas
well #28
Lake Mead •
Intake
I II 11
10 20 '30 I 40 50 60
Scale in Kilometers
31 wells around the Nevada Test Site are sampled twice a year.
SOURCE: Modified from Department of Energy.
Related OTA Report
• Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties.
OTA-ISC-361. 5/88; 139 pages. GPO stock #052-003-01 108-5; $7.50.
NTIS order #PB 88-214 853/XAB.
NOTE: Repons arc available from the U.S. Govcmmcm Priming Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402-9325 (202-783-3238);
and the National Tfechnical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road. Springfield, VA 22161-0001 (703-487-4650).
n
t- P
o O
— T3
?4o
.2 "
es TS
c
1
1) '
B
3
o
O
Q
o
—
c
u
"O
c
a
c
— <
I — I u
= S
a -^ " !=■
<
y
'c^
o
O
Q.
X
a
u
Q
O
a.
<
C/5
O
>
EDDn
^ ^
a
s
CO
•— O IT)
2 Is w
5 «^-
i/3
□
•N ^
Si s
S 2
•S
§ I
4- 9
h o
■ -SO
>. c u
£ M >
<*. U O
O 00 —
o a.r<-i «
■" nj I H
£ o o S
H T3 (N tS
B S
Office of Technology Assessment
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was created in 1972 as an
analytical arm of Congress. OTA's basic function is to help legislative policy-
makers anticipate and plan for the consequences of technological changes and
to examine the many ways, expected and unexpected, in which technology
affects people's lives. The assessment of technology calls for exploration of
the physical, biological, economic, social, and political impacts that can result
from applications of scientific knowledge. OTA provides Congress with in-
dependent and timely information about the potential effects — both benefi-
cial and harmful — of technological applications.
Requests for studies are made by chairmen of standing committees of the
House of Representatives or Senate; by the Technology Assessment Board,
the governing body of OTA; or by the Director of OTA in consultation with
the Board.
The Technology Assessment Board is composed of six members of the
House, six members of the Senate, and the OTA Director, who is a non-
voting member.
OTA has studies under way in nine program areas: energy and materials;
industry, technology, and employment; international security and commerce;
biological applications; food and renewable resources; health; communication
and information technologies; oceans and environment; and science, educa-
tion, and transportation.
OTA-ISC-414 OCTOBER 1989
